





Etsy was a crown jewel of socially responsible businesses. It prioritized 
female entrepreneurship, its employees, and environmental stewardship. It 
was widely admired as a company pursuing social goals alongside profit 
goals. But after scaling up through an IPO, Etsy fell apart both socially and 
financially. Similar stories proliferate in the world of socially conscious 
business. What happened? Standard accounts point to greedy investors, 
capitalism, and short-termism as the culprits.  
But this Paper identifies a more fundamental problem: business law is not 
designed to facilitate scale-ups for companies that articulate objectives 
beyond profit. It lacks a durable commitment mechanism for these 
companies to bind themselves to long-term pursuit of their multiple 
objectives. To help address this problem, the Paper argues for providing a 
voluntary commitment mechanism in business law. The proposed 
commitment mechanism would require multiple stakeholder board 
representation and socially conscious executive compensation for public 
benefit corporations that IPO, get acquired, or exceed a certain size. Such 
legislation could better enable companies to bind themselves to their 
objectives beyond profit at scale — facilitating large-scale social impact 
instead of just large-scale profit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Etsy was a crown jewel of the movement for socially 
conscious business, simultaneously pursuing multiple objectives 
beyond profit. It successfully operated for over ten years fulfilling its 
objectives to treat its employees well through its distinctive and 
compassionate company culture, to help entrepreneurs — and 
especially female entrepreneurs — make a living selling their 
homemade goods online, and to maintain high environmental 
standards.1 Etsy was one of the largest certified B-Corps in existence, 
meeting rigorous standards set by a third-party nonprofit certifier for 
the pursuit of social and environmental goals in business. The company 
also did well financially.2 After a decade it was ready to scale up, which 
it did through an initial public offering (“IPO”). Etsy’s IPO was one of 
the first ever for a certified B-Corp.  
But fast forward two years and Etsy had fallen apart both socially and 
financially, despite its attempts to preserve its multiple objectives 
through private ordering.3 Several activist investors acquired stakes in 
the company and elected new members to the board, which abruptly 
laid off eighty employees and fired the beloved CEO in dramatic 
fashion.4 The board appointed a successor with a single-minded profit 
 
 1 David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GAN8-EJGZ]; see also Nikita T. Mitchell, Etsy Made Mistakes, But Its Commitment to Social 
Responsibility Wasn’t One of Them, QUARTZ (Dec. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/work/1146365/ 
etsy-made-mistakes-from-which-other-b-corps-can-learn/ [https://perma.cc/5NGM-UFHU]; 
Adele Peters, Will Etsy Keep Its Commitment to Social Good After Its Management Shakeup?, 
FAST COMPANY (May 4, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40418325/will-etsy-keep-
its-commitment-to-social-good-after-its-management-shakeup [https://perma.cc/9MPE-
TNNH]. 
 2 See Etsy, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2 (Mar. 4, 2015).  
 3 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1. “Private 
ordering” refers to the development of firm-specific governance terms, which 
companies develop to achieve their individual organizational aims. Firms do so 
particularly through corporate governance measures, such as their articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, but private ordering could also include implementation of 
organizational practices or other forms of private enforcement. See Jill E. Fisch, 
Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 
378 (2018) [hereinafter Governance by Contract]; Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why 
Congress Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 743 n.80 
(2013); D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with 
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 (2011); see also Ofer Eldar, The 
Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 92, 165 
[hereinafter Role of Social Enterprise]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 319, 321 (2002). 
 4 Gelles, supra note 1; see also Mitchell, supra note 1. 
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focus, who cut projects and laid off an additional 140 employees.5 
Online sellers’ dissatisfaction and mistrust of the company grew.6 
Employees felt betrayed.7 And in a culminating move, the company 
announced it would not seek recertification as a B-Corp, tolling the 
formal loss of the social purpose objectives.8 Etsy has since bounced 
back and experienced conventional financial success — but it never 
reclaimed its previous commitment to multiple objectives.9 
The story of a company losing its multiple objectives after scaling up 
is a common one, whether the company chooses to scale through an 
IPO like Etsy, or through another avenue such as an acquisition.10 Take, 
for example, Kashi’s demise after it was acquired by Kellogg,11 Plum 
Organics’ stagnation after it was acquired by Campbell’s, or Hello 
Fresh’s difficult post-acquisition integration of Green Chef.12 This Paper 
examines why companies that explicitly articulate objectives other than 
profit maximizing face such challenges in scaling up. And it shows that 
part of the problem (and solution) is found not in market demand or 
the firm’s operations, but rather in the structure of business law. 
 
 5 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1. 
 6 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1. 
 7 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1. 
 8 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1. 




TJm2krVd5pU_r9T7r-h-dbE5ryNnP (last visited February 27, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
A2KQ-WNZQ]. It should also be noted that Etsy experienced significant increases in its 
share price beginning in March 2020. From March 2020 to August 2020, its share price 
doubled. This boost coincides with the pandemic and stay at home orders, suggesting it may 
relate to increased online shopping during this time period rather than representing a 
permanent boost.  
 10 Although it is difficult to quantify because there is no central repository of IPOs 
and acquisitions of companies that pursue social purpose alongside profit, interviews 
with fourteen field sites, as well as with venture capitalists, suggest a considerable 
perception among practitioners that these acquisitions and IPOs lead to a loss of the 
pursuit of multiple objectives. See Part I.C. 
 11 David Kesmodel & Annie Gasparro, Inside Kellogg’s Effort to Cash in on the Health-
Food Craze, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-kelloggs-
effort-to-cash-in-on-the-health-food-craze-1441073082 [https://perma.cc/8F3E-EACH]. 
 12 Interviews with employees — from interns to executives — at fourteen different 
companies gave insights into some of these and other acquisitions. See Emilie Aguirre, 
Pairing Purpose with Profit (dissertation, Harvard Bus. Sch.) (forthcoming 2021). 
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Companies with objectives beyond profit offer significant potential 
for social and economic impact.13 They can leverage economies of scope 
to help solve some of society’s most pressing problems and address 
untenable externalities, sometimes even more effectively and efficiently 
than current approaches by the government or charitable sector, and 
other times as an important complement to these sectors.14 For 
example, these companies can help address the labor inequality, 
burnout, and worker commodification they may generate, in ways 
tailored to the unique needs of their own firms and industries.15 
Companies with objectives beyond profit can often also address social 
and environmental externalities that both they and other firms generate. 
For example, a company may use data it already collects to improve the 
environmental or social impact of its products or its customers in ways 
 
 13 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 104 (2015) [hereinafter Social Enterprise as Commitment]. 
 14 Leveraging economies of scope refers to the practice of bundling production of a 
variety of products — rather than a quantity of products, as in the case of economies of 
scale. So, for example, one can think of Patagonia as leveraging economies of scope in 
producing both jackets and environmental benefit. See John C. Panzar & Robert D. 
Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268 (1981). Companies that pursue 
objectives beyond profit can offer solutions that may be more efficient — that cost less 
or require less regulation and external monitoring to achieve. See M. Todd Henderson 
& Anup Malani, Essay, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 571, 602 (2009); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit 
Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2064-67 (2007). But see Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, 
supra note, 3 at 177-79; Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1214-
15 (2010); James R. Hines Jr., Jill R Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1182-84 (2010). For more on 
the inefficiency of regulation to achieve social goals, see, for example, Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-69 (1994). 
 15 In some cases, these companies can do so more effectively than outside players or 
outside regulation because they have the ability to directly set employee policies in ways 
outside players cannot. For example, a company is well-suited to hire a more diverse 
workforce or create a more diverse internship feeder program; or change employee 
policies around parental leave, hours worked, and vacation time; or to implement an 
organizational practice that values or empowers employees or solicits employee feedback. 
Employees also generally prefer to work at companies with objectives beyond profit, 
leading to better workplace fulfillment and labor outcomes. In fact, employees frequently 
trade lower salaries to engage in work with a sense of purpose. See Jing Hu & Jacob B. 
Hirsh, Accepting Lower Salaries for Meaningful Work, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1649, 1649 
(2017); Shawn Achor, Andrew Reece, Gabriella Rosen Kellerman & Alexi Robichaux, 9 
Out of 10 People Are Willing to Earn Less Money to Do More-Meaningful Work, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/9-out-of-10-people-are-willing-to-earn-less-
money-to-do-more-meaningful-work [https://perma.cc/QZD7-MB8B]; see also Gelles, 
supra note 1 (stating that employees took lower salaries to work at Etsy because it provided 
meaningful work). 
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that government regulation and nonprofit activity cannot achieve on 
their own.16 In addition, current approaches often rely on significant 
piecemeal command and control legislation, such as in employment 
law, environmental law, or tax law, that can be inefficient in achieving 
social goals.17 Multiple objective companies usually do not require 
much additional punitive or incentivizing legislation outside of 
business law to motivate their pro-social behavior because it forms part 
of their core organizational goals.18 Government and charitable sector 
approaches also often require significant government or donative 
funding, due to the absence of self-sustaining revenue. In contrast, like 
all for-profit ventures, these companies are designed ultimately to 
succeed in self-sustaining ways that are not primarily reliant on 
donations, grants, or government support.19 
 
 16 Take, for example, Patagonia, which created entire supply chains of organic 
cotton production through its decision to source organic cotton in its products. FOREST 
REINHARDT, RAMON CASADESUS-MASANELL & HYUN JIN KIM, HARV. BUS. SCH., PATAGONIA 
4 (2010). To take another example, another company in the tech sector uses data 
collected from its restaurant customers to help reduce their food waste much more 
effectively than a government mandate or external nonprofit organization could do on 
its own. In fact, that company partners with a nonprofit specializing in food waste to 
help produce this outcome — underscoring that the nonprofit would not be well-suited 
on its own without the data stewardship of the tech company. See Emilie Aguirre, The 
Social Startup (forthcoming 2022). 
 17 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14 (arguing that redistribution is 
accomplished more efficiently through the income tax system than through legal rules). 
 18 See generally Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, 7 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 263 (1985) (exploring the concept of organizational identity); 
Julie Battilana & Silvia Dorado, Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations: The Case of 
Commercial Microfinance Organizations, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1419 (2010) (analyzing the 
pro-social goals of microfinance organizations); Mary Ann Glynn, When Cymbals 
Become Symbols: Conflict Over Organizational Identity Within a Symphony Orchestra, 11 
ORG. SCI. 285 (2000) (discussing implications for managing organizational forms); 
Anne-Claire Pache & Filipe Santos, Inside the Hybrid Organization: Selective Coupling as 
a Response to Competing Institutional Logics, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 972 (2013) (exploring 
the internal logistics of hybrid organizations); Wendy K. Smith & Marya L. Besharov, 
Bowing Before Dual Gods: How Structured Flexibility Sustains Organizational Hybridity, 
64 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (2019) (discussing sustainable hybrid organizations); Tyler Wry & 
Jeffrey G. York, An Identity-Based Approach to Social Enterprise, 42 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
437 (2017) (exploring social enterprises as a tool for addressing social and 
environmental problems).  
 19 But see Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 182. This analysis is not 
to suggest that for-profit companies — even those committed to social purpose 
alongside profit — should replace robust government and charitable activity to address 
societal problems, nor to suggest that traditional companies are completely unable to 
achieve these outcomes. Rather, it is to suggest that companies with objectives beyond 
profit can serve as an important complement, increasing social impact. See generally 
Albert & Whetten, supra note 18 (exploring the concept of organizational identity); 
  
2021] Beyond Profit 2083 
Founders can privately order companies in many ways to try to 
preserve their multiple objectives over the long term.20 For example, 
they can incorporate as traditional general corporations, but add 
specific provisions to their charters articulating their objectives beyond 
profit.21 They can incorporate as public benefit corporations (“PBCs”), 
which are legally required to pursue both social purpose and profit.22 
And regardless of their legal incorporation, they can privately contract 
to achieve social good, including for example by seeking B-Corp 
certification.23 But — crucially — it seems that no matter how they 
privately order themselves, they cannot durably commit to their 
multiple objectives over the long term. The problem is particularly 
acute when these companies scale up: no matter which scaling avenue 
they pursue, they cannot systematically tie themselves to the mast of 
their multiple objectives. The inability to reliably scale limits their 
potential for larger social and economic impact. It requires them to 
choose between staying small in size or abandoning the multiple 
objectives in order to scale up. 
Standard accounts of the failure to scale point to market forces. In 
this narrative, greedy investors, capitalism, and short-termism are the 
culprits, or the failure is simply accepted on the grounds that there is 
no demand for these companies.24 These accounts often claim 
companies with multiple objectives must simply have inferior 
 
Battilana & Dorado, supra note 18 (analyzing the pro-social goals of microfinance 
organizations); Glynn, supra note 18 (discussing implications for managing 
organizational forms); Pache & Santos, supra note 18 (exploring the internal logistics 
of hybrid organizations); Smith & Besharov, supra note 18 (discussing sustainable 
hybrid organizations); Wry & York, supra note 18 (exploring social enterprises as a tool 
for addressing social and environmental problems). 
 20 See Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment, supra note 13, at 95. 
 21 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2020).  
 22 DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC 
BENEFIT, & CAPITAL MARKETS 52-53 (2017); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations: 
A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 597 (2011); see also 
State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/ 
state-by-state-status (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y2T2-L9LF] 
(showing that the thirty-seven states with benefit corporation statutes includes the 
District of Columbia). 
 23 See Certification, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/certification (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q4FC-W83T]. 
 24 See, e.g., Marc Gunther, B Corps: Sustainability Will Be Shaped by the Market, Not 
Corporate Law, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/b-corps-markets-corporate-law [https://perma.cc/CU85-56SC] (describing the 
maximization of profits as a market force). 
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underlying business models, or that pursuing objectives beyond profit 
is not possible or desired at scale. 
But this Paper finds that these accounts miss a fundamental problem: 
business law is not designed to facilitate scale-ups for companies with 
multiple objectives.25 Most importantly, business law lacks a durable 
commitment mechanism to enable long-term pursuit of multiple 
objectives beyond profit.26 This problem is particularly acute when 
scaling up because of a dual-pronged loss of strategic and managerial 
control that founders experience over the board and the day-to-day 
operations of the company, respectively.27 This Paper argues that no 
matter how these companies choose to legally incorporate, privately 
order themselves, or scale up, business law fails to provide them with a 
durable commitment mechanism to help counter these losses of 
strategic and managerial control at scale. 
This commitment problem reduces these companies’ potential for 
social and economic impact and limits founders’ abilities to privately 
order themselves how they wish — in this case, to use a for-profit legal 
entity to pursue objectives beyond profit.28 The lacking commitment 
mechanism also undermines contracts with key third-party 
stakeholders, who rely on the company’s pursuit of objectives beyond 
 
 25 For example, the public benefit corporation law in Delaware was drafted 
especially with privately held companies in mind. Professor Haskell Murray refers to 
the 2015 DGCL public benefit corporation amendments as “the Etsy Amendments,” 
due to a belief that a main motivation behind them was to make it easier for Etsy, and 
others, to become Delaware PBCs after going public. See J. Haskell Murray, Amendments 
to Delaware PBC Law (“The Etsy Amendments”), BUS. L. PROF BLOG (July 3, 2015), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/07/amendments-to-delaware-
pbc-law-the-etsy-amendments.html [https://perma.cc/7WAP-3CWC]. 
 26 See Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment, supra note 13, at 91-92. 
 27 The company usually experiences a loss of strategic control because it has 
accessed outside equity capital to scale, meaning the founders give up some ownership 
shares in the company in exchange for a capital investment. This dispersed share 
ownership leads to loss of control over the board — the body that makes high-level 
strategic company decisions. A company may also seek debt rather than equity 
financing. These companies can also experience losses of control due to the terms 
attached to restrictive covenants. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 257-58 (2015) [hereinafter 
Shareholder Wealth]; infra Part IV.B.1. At the same time, the company also experiences 
a loss of managerial control because of the scaled-up company’s larger size, which 
reduces oversight and monitoring of day-to-day company decision-making that occurs 
at the managerial level. Such decisions include, for example, hiring, human resources, 
suppliers, distribution channels, customer relations. 
 28 See J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, HARV. BUS. L. REV., 345, 366-7 (2014); Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as 
Commitment, supra note 13, at 91-92. 
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profit.29 There is even evidence that some investors and lenders will give 
favorable financing terms to companies that can credibly commit to the 
pursuit of multiple objectives beyond profit, due to lower long-term risk 
assessments.30 
To help address this problem, the Paper advocates for providing a 
voluntary commitment mechanism in business law. The proposed 
commitment mechanism would consist of a two-pronged proposal that 
would require multiple stakeholder board representation and socially 
conscious executive compensation for PBCs that IPO, get acquired, or 
exceed a certain size.31 Multiple stakeholder board representation 
would require equal representation between shareholder-elected board 
members and social purpose-elected board members. The social 
purpose board members might consist of employees, nonprofit charity 
members, or academics, and would be elected by a third-party coalition 
of disinterested non-shareholders aligned with the company’s social 
purpose objectives. Socially conscious executive compensation would 
link a substantial proportion of executive pay to achievement of certain 
 
 29 For example, investors and lenders make significant financial investments in the 
firm and seek certainty and stability in doing so. Employees may select the firm because 
of its pursuit of multiple objectives. Customers may only pay a premium for products 
from a firm with objectives beyond profit. See Murray, supra note 28, at 364-5 
(describing assurances investors need when investing in companies committed to 
pursuit of both social purpose and profit); Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment, 
supra note 13, at 99. 
 30 See Danone’s Positive Incentive Financing Strategy, BNP PARIBAS (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://cib.bnpparibas.com/sustain/danone-s-positive-incentive-financing-strategy_a-3-
2238.html [https://perma.cc/3K7R-QBZ2]. If these commitments could be 
systematized, it could help shift funding toward socially oriented businesses with a 
long-term perspective, rather than being an unusual, notable example. In addition to 
investors, employees also make costly firm-specific investments. For them, a company’s 
pursuit of objectives beyond profit may be a material factor in employment. Many 
scholars have shown how employee knowledge, skills, and abilities at a certain firm 
have limited value outside of a given firm, and that this firm-specificity encumbers 
mobility. Employees therefore likely rely on the certainty and permanence of the pursuit 
of multiple objectives over time. See Russell W. Coff, Human Assets and Management 
Dilemmas: Coping with Hazards on the Road to Resource-Based Theory, 22 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 374, 380 (1997); Nile W. Hatch & Jeffrey H. Dyer, Human Capital & Learning as a 
Source of Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1155, 1156 (2004); 
Yasemin Y. Kor & Huseyin Leblebici, How Do Interdependencies Among Human-Capital 
Deployment, Development, and Diversification Strategies Affect Firms’ Financial 
Performance?, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 967, 973 (2005); see, e.g., Achor et al., supra note 
15 (discussing employee desire for meaningful work); Hu & Hirsh, supra note 15, at 
1649 (finding that employees are willing to accept lower salaries for more meaningful 
work); see also Gelles, supra note 1.  
 31 That is, the commitment mechanism proposal would not be waivable or 
redeemable. 
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social impact metrics, such as employee satisfaction and environmental 
impact, rather than pegging compensation almost entirely to financial 
metrics, as it is currently. These metrics would all be verified according 
to third-party standards, rather than by the company itself. 
The proposed commitment mechanism is well-suited to help address 
the problems associated with the loss of strategic (board) and 
managerial (day-to-day) control at scale. It addresses the loss of 
strategic control by targeting the board of directors and helping balance 
social purpose and profit in the key strategic decision-making at the 
board level. Socially conscious executive compensation addresses the 
loss of managerial control by targeting company executives and helping 
ensure better balance between social purpose goals and financial goals 
in their daily management of the firm. It would offer companies that 
wish to opt in a means to bind themselves to the pursuit of objectives 
beyond profit, without imposing any requirements on companies that 
do not wish to do so.  
By enabling firms to more credibly bind themselves to their multiple 
objectives, these solutions would help make PBC law more meaningful 
and facilitate private ordering — a fundamental aim of business law that 
the current legal framework undermines. Perhaps most importantly, 
these proposals can also facilitate companies with a proven track record 
of achieving both social and economic impact to do so on an even larger 
scale — better enabling large-scale social impact, instead of just large-
scale profit. 
This Paper proceeds as follows. Part I defines and distinguishes 
companies that have articulated objectives beyond profit maximization. 
It describes their value and why they warrant preservation, and provides 
evidence for the scaling up problem. Part II describes how these 
companies currently attempt to privately order themselves to achieve 
their objectives through traditional incorporation, PBC incorporation, 
and private contracting, including B-Corp certification. Part III argues 
that when these companies scale up, they systematically struggle to 
retain their objectives beyond profit no matter how they scale, how they 
legally incorporate, or how they privately order themselves. Business 
law fails to provide them with a durable commitment mechanism. Part 
IV advocates addressing this problem by providing a voluntary 
commitment mechanism in corporate law. The proposed commitment 
mechanism would require multiple stakeholder board representation 
and socially conscious executive compensation for PBCs at scale. 
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I. COMPANIES WITH OBJECTIVES BEYOND PROFIT 
This Part defines companies that have articulated objectives beyond 
profit maximization and distinguishes them from other socially 
conscious behavior in business. It also describes these companies’ value 
and why they warrant preservation. 
A. Defining and Distinguishing 
Socially conscious behavior in business is on the rise. 32 Even for-
profit firms that primarily pursue a single profit objective increasingly 
enumerate social or problem-solving goals alongside, and often in 
tension with, their profit goals.33 It can be difficult to precisely define 
and categorize socially conscious firms.34 
But recent years have seen an unprecedented surge in firms that 
articulate and explicitly commit to pursuing objectives beyond profit.35 
 
 32 See Julie Battilana, Metin Sengul, Anne-Claire Pache & Jacob Model, Harnessing 
Productive Tensions in Hybrid Organizations: The Case of Work Integration Social 
Enterprises, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1658, 1658 (2015) [hereinafter Harnessing Productive 
Tensions]. 
 33 See, e.g., Julie Battilana, Marya Besharov & Bjoern Mitzinneck, On Hybrids and 
Hybrid Organizing: A Review and Roadmap for Future Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK 
OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 128, 143-44 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2017) [hereinafter On Hybrids and Hybrid Organizing]. 
 34 See Elizabeth Pollman, Social and Asocial Enterprise, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 1, 15 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018). 
 35 Battilana et al., Harnessing Productive Tensions, supra note 32, at 1658 
(documenting the unprecedented rise of organizations jointly pursuing social and 
commercial objectives in the past thirty years). Pursuing both social purpose and profit 
objectives under the same organizational roof is not a new phenomenon. Prior to the 
past thirty to forty years, social purpose has not been so disassociated from commercial 
pursuits, including in for-profit firms like corporations. In fact, in the nineteenth 
century, for-profit firms had to prove they were serving a social good in order to receive 
a charter from the state. Even in the past few decades, for-profit firms have consistently 
engaged in plenty of non-profit-related activities — such that firms should be 
understood as utility maximizers rather than strictly profit maximizers. But in recent 
years, there has been a sharp and unprecedented rise in for-profit firms that explicitly 
seek to pursue both social purpose and profit — companies like Etsy, Patagonia, 
Seventh Generation, Tom’s Shoes, and Warby Parker. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The 
Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 (2005); Matthew G. Grimes, Trenton 
Alma Williams & Eric Yanfei Zhao, Anchors Aweigh: The Sources, Variety, and Challenges 
of Mission Drift, 44 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 819, 820 (2019) (arguing that claiming to have 
multiple objectives alongside profit is not new for corporations, and the fact that firms 
take time to formulate mission statements is proof that they are not meaningless); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. 
VA. L. REV. 173, 209 (1986); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
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These companies differ from other for-profits, including ones that may 
be socially conscious in some ways, in that they pursue both social 
purposes and profit as core organizational goals. Socially conscious 
behavior in for-profit firms does not fit neatly into pre-prescribed 
categories, but rather, should be visualized along a spectrum. The 
spectrum ranges from firms that make occasional pro-social decisions 
all the way down to firms that make social purpose and profit objectives 
core to their organization and consider their multiple objectives in all 
or nearly all of their decision-making. Designations such as “corporate 
philanthropy,” “corporate social responsibility,” “mission-driven 
business,” and “purpose-driven” can be thought of as roughly 
corresponding to this spectrum of activity. 
On one end of the spectrum, primarily profit-focused companies may 
still engage in some ad hoc pro-social acts, such as corporate 
philanthropy.36 As the spectrum progresses, companies increasingly 
place equal weight on pro-social and pro-profit objectives. For example, 
in the middle of the spectrum, firms may engage in corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) initiatives that are more pro-social than 
corporate philanthropy, but still on the fringes of their business 
model.37 Further down the spectrum, some firms are mission-driven 
and link their business models intimately with social purpose.38 But 
even for these companies, when social purpose comes into conflict with 
profit, they ultimately choose profit. Companies on the farthest end of 
the spectrum are those that explicitly articulate and pursue social 
purpose objectives co-equal with profit. These companies most equally 
weight social purpose and profit.39 
 
201, 201; see also Christine Vallaster, Francois Maon, Adam Lindgreen & Joëlle 
Vanhamme, Serving Multiple Masters: The Role of Micro-Foundations of Dynamic 
Capabilities in Addressing Tensions in For-Profit Hybrid Organizations, ORG. STUD., June 
2019, at 1, 2-3. 
 36 These pro-social acts also come with significant tax breaks, moderating their pro-
sociality. 
 37 See Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 159-63; Julie Battilana, Anne-
Claire Pache, Metin Sengul & Marissa Kimsey, The Dual-Purpose Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar.–Apr. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/03/the-dual-purpose-playbook [https://perma.cc/ 
PQ6R-4HWV].  
 38 Mission-driven companies can be thought of a for-profit enterprise that 
incorporates a social purpose into its strategy and operations. CCM Staff, What is a 
Conscious Company? SOCAP DIGITAL (May 10, 2020), https://socapglobal.com/2020/ 
05/what-is-a-conscious-company/ [https://perma.cc/3KPU-YFTE]. 
 39 For example, a C-Suite executive at a Fortune 500 single profit objective 
company described how two of the companies they had acquired “were a different 
animal altogether. . . . All in, 100% . . . . They were an army of real true believers in 
what they were doing, from a mission and B-Corp perspective. . . . [We] said [they] 
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In the hybrid organizations literature within the discipline of 
management, Professors Battilana, Sengul, and Pache substantiate this 
empirically informed notion of a socially conscious spectrum.40 Hybrid 
organizations are those that combine organizational goals that are not 
usually thought to go together — such as social purpose and profit.41 
Battilana et al. show how hybrid organizing should be thought of as 
occurring as a matter of degree, rather than as a binary phenomenon, as 
it is commonly conceived.42 This conception of hybrid organizing seems 
to better reflect the empirical reality, at least in the for-profit context, 
that firms frequently have multiple or nuanced objectives that 
incorporate some element of social purpose, and that they do so to 
varying degrees. Firms that explicitly articulate and commit to their 
multiple objectives prioritize social purpose objectives alongside profit 
to the greatest extent of all for-profit firms. 
A key distinction, then, between firms that articulate multiple core 
organizational objectives and firms that may pursue ad hoc socially 
conscious behavior, seems to be that when firms with multiple 
objectives face zero-sum tradeoffs between social purpose and profit, 
they do not always choose the profit objective.43 In addition, these 
 
were going to try to learn from them. We left them alone . . . . But [our group] doesn’t 
understand the B-Corp thing. . . . [The acquired company] was spending money on . . . 
food donations and nutritional education. They’re trying to convince [us] that that’s the 
brand, that’s the marketing. . . . [The acquired company] hasn’t grown. It is stagnant, 
stable. Most of it is [our] fault.” Whereas the target company saw social purpose as 
intertwined with achieving financial goals, the parent company saw the two as mutually 
exclusive. Interview with Executive at pilot research company (Oct. 2018) (transcript 
on file with author). See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 40 See Battilana et al., Harnessing Productive Tensions, supra note 32, at 1658-59. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 1664. 
 43 This definition draws from original empirical work on companies that articulate 
objectives beyond profit. See Aguirre, supra note 12. It consisted of fifty-five semi-
structured interviews conducted at fourteen companies over nearly two years, ranging 
from interns at early-stage startups to C-Suite executives at Fortune 500 companies. 
The sample includes nine companies that either currently or previously identified as 
having multiple objectives, and five companies that never have. It includes eleven 
companies that have adopted a “traditional” corporate form such as a limited liability 
company or general corporation, and three incorporated as PBCs. All three PBCs are 
also certified B-Corps, and one of the traditional companies achieved certified B-Corp 
status. Companies are in the tech, finance, and food sectors. They include an early-stage 
startup, privately held scaled company, franchise, seven subsidiaries or separate 
business units, and four publicly traded companies. Six of the companies were also 
recently venture-backed growth-stage startups that were acquired or scaled up privately. 
The empirical work also included in-depth on-site research over ten months at two 
research sites: An early-stage tech startup and a large publicly traded multinational 
company and three of its subsidiaries or business units in the consumer packaged goods 
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companies seem to attempt to optimize along both social purpose and 
profit dimensions as much as possible in their decision-making 
processes.44 Optimizing along both dimensions may take a few different 
forms depending on the company, or may even vary among teams and 
individuals within the same company.45 But in this way, companies with 
multiple objectives attempt to get around zero-sum decisions, by trying 
to make these decisions not zero-sum to the extent possible. Instead, 
they consistently view decision-making as containing inherent tensions 
and simply requiring more creativity, consensus-building, and time to 
solve along both social purpose and profit dimensions.46 In contrast, 
 
and finance sectors. All research took place from October 2018 through February 2021. 
Empirical research in management supports this claim. See Battilana et al., On Hybrids 
and Hybrid Organizing, supra note 33, at 152-53; Vallaster et al., supra note 35, at 2-3; 
see also Battilana et al., Harnessing Productive Tensions, supra note 32, at 1674. 
 44 For example, one early-stage startup has a senior leadership position devoted to 
sustainability, despite the fact that the company is pre-profitable and every dollar counts 
for survival. It does so because it is committed to its sustainability objective. See Aguirre, 
supra note 16. To take another example, several respondents at one multiple objective 
company described a decision-making framework in which they always examine both 
the financial and social implications of a proposed course of action. For example, one 
respondent said, “I think the first thing we look at is, does it make good business sense? 
And then the other thing we look at, . . . is it aligned with our global vision and mission? 
. . . I wouldn’t say it’s always originally a financial decision, but in most cases we’re 
looking at, is it going to bring us a social impact? Or is it going to bring us a financial 
impact? Some cases, it doesn’t bring us any financial impact, it could just be a social 
decision.” See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 45 For example, one growth stage (i.e., later-stage) startup uses a process of radical 
transparency, publicly blogging about its decision-making processes to ensure 
accountability. It even previously made all internal emails available to everyone in the 
company. Although it always considers social and financial impact, decision-making in 
the large company varies by team and department. See Battilana et al., Harnessing 
Productive Tensions, supra note 32, at 1674-75; Battilana & Dorado, supra note 18, at 
1420; Pache & Santos, supra note 18, at 995; Smith & Besharov, supra note 18, at 4. 
 46 For example, the early-stage startup with the senior leadership position also 
folded customer education into the role in order to align sustainability with customer 
success. See Aguirre, supra note 16. Another company with multiple objectives beyond 
profit lamented the lack of efficiency associated with its creative and consensus-building 
decision-making framework, but highlighted how it resulted in outcomes that used 
creativity to maximize both social purpose and profit and to meet all of their 
organizational objectives. For example, a manager described all the creativity and 
organizational democracy his team brings to decision-making processes, then described 
how “letting any idea be explored can really, it can hurt efficiency at some point. And I 
think that’s the other, you know, we’ve talked a lot about the good parts of this. There 
are a lot of bad parts of this such as, that it’s hard to do both. It’s really hard to say, ‘I’m 
going to do both things [social purpose and profit] at the same time.’ And, I’m an 
engineer by trade, so I think about efficiency a lot. It’s all I think about all the time. 
And, when I see myself pinging from one thing to the other and the other I realize that 
I’m just not efficient with my time.” See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
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traditional for-profit companies seem considerably more likely to 
perceive decisions as zero-sum.47 Although these companies might 
pursue pro-social behavior in some contexts, when faced with a 
perceived zero-sum choice, they reliably make those decisions along a 
profit dimension.48 
B. The Value of Companies with Objectives Beyond Profit 
Companies that have articulated objectives beyond profit represent 
an important innovation in business with the potential to help improve 
overall social welfare.49 Many of these companies are developing 
technologies, products, organizational structures, and business models 
to help solve some of the world’s most serious problems, including 
systemic threats to sustainability and climate change; public health 
crises and alarming rates of noncommunicable disease; gender, racial, 
and ethnic inequalities; and untenable labor outcomes. In tandem with 
current approaches in government and the nonprofit charitable sector, 
these firms offer potential to help solve intractable social problems and 
address untenable externalities in effective and efficient ways. In doing 
so, they can serve as an important complement to current approaches 
 
 47 See Aguirre, supra note 12. For example, a C-Suite executive of one Fortune 500 
single-objective company described how “leaders of publicly traded companies are all 
paid the same: based on shareholder returns, and every single one is incentivized to 
compete on share price.” He went onto describe how his company culture is 
characterized by “growth growth growth.” At his company, they “don’t see a disconnect 
between growth and purpose” — until a brand stops growing, at which point he said 
they immediately cut costs associated with the social purpose. This respondent noted 
that all big companies in their sector had similarly focused on cutting costs over the 
past decade. Interview with Executive at pilot research company (Oct. 2018) (on file 
with author); see Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 48 See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 49 See Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 95. Although it is difficult to 
quantify the number of such companies in existence, to give a rough proxy sense, there 
are over 3500 certified B-Corps globally, over two-hundred PBCs incorporated in 
Delaware, and near four thousand PBCs incorporated in the United States. Charlie 
Kannel & May Samali, Startups: Should You Incorporate as a Public Benefit Corporation?, 
VENTURE BEAT (Apr. 30, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/04/30/startups-should-
you-incorporate-as-a-public-benefit-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/5LGB-QEJT]; How 
Many Certified B Corps Are There Around the World?, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
https://bcorporation.net/faq-item/how-many-certified-b-corps-are-there-around-world 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4JEL-GSMG]; What You Need to Know 
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by government and nonprofit charities, and as valuable routes to capital 
needed for large-scale impact.50 
All companies implicate various social issues — such as labor 
inequality, environmental sustainability, public health, and gender, 
racial and ethnic justice — in nearly every business decision they make. 
For example, a company implicates racial, ethnic, and gender diversity 
in how it recruits and retains employees, including where and how it 
hires interns or entry-level employees; how it sets its standards for 
promotion; and its parental leave policies.51 A company implicates the 
environment, human rights and labor practices when it chooses 
suppliers to procure its inputs, and sets required standards for its 
suppliers to follow.52 A company frequently implicates population 
health and safety with its product lines or its developments in research 
and innovation.53 And it implicates a range of social issues across its 
other business decisions — such as how it collects and uses data, 
markets products, selects customers, and secures capital.54 
 
 50 See Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Companies and the 
Charitable Dollar 5 (Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 48, 2014); see also Elizabeth 
Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 
(2017) (noting a rising trend of companies for which changing the law is a significant 
part of their business plan, and acting as agents of legal change). Powerful arguments 
have been made for why legal rules are less efficient than using, for example, the income 
tax system to redistribute income directly. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 667. 
Companies with objectives beyond profit are attractive because they do not rely on legal 
rules to redistribute income, but can serve multiple objectives beyond just income 
redistribution. They provide another tenable solution that can help solve multiple 
intractable social problems at once, while also not reducing incentives to work, which 
Kaplow and Shavell argue is attractive about the income tax system. See also Alicia E. 
Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public Benefit 
Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 545 (2017) [hereinafter Nonprofit 
Displacement]. 
 51 See, e.g., Robin J. Ely & Irene Padavic, What’s Really Holding Women Back?, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2020, at 58, 60 (noting companies are seeking solution in retaining 
women and promoting them to senior ranks). 
 52 Take, for example, Danone’s RESPECT program with its suppliers, which 
explicitly recognizes the social and environmental impacts of supply chains. Responsible 
Company Practices, DANONE, https://www.danone.com/impact/health/responsible-
company-practices.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/RWA8-NLL9]. 
These implications are often compounded if the company has a global supply chain. 
 53 For example, product lines in the food, beverage, agriculture, drug and 
pharmaceutical, tobacco, firearm, vitamin, cosmetics, health and beauty, infant 
products, technology, video game, automobile, mining, petrochemical, and 
transportation industries, among many others, all have significant effects on public 
health. 
 54 How a company collects and uses big data can affect all of these social issues. 
How a company uses data to determine customer experience and marketing can either 
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Companies that pursue objectives beyond profit offer a unique 
opportunity because unlike traditional companies, they attempt to 
privately order themselves to account for social goals alongside their 
financial goals. Having these two core organizational objectives bleeds 
into every aspect of their company decision-making, which creates 
significant — and presently largely under-realized — potential for social 
impact across a variety of dimensions. For example, these companies 
can make procurement decisions using higher environmental 
standards,55 develop product lines that prioritize human health,56 or 
recruit and promote a more gender, racially, and ethnically diverse 
workforce.57 They are well-situated to help address labor inequality and 
 
reduce or reinforce socioeconomic and racial inequalities, environmental impact, public 
health outcomes, and so on. How a company geographically tracks and targets its 
customers with advertisements can reinforce socioeconomic and racial inequalities, or 
improve or exacerbate public health outcomes. In some industries, data collected can 
provide insight into environmental impacts that a company can either leverage or 
ignore. How a company markets product can also have significant social impacts, 
particularly if it markets to children or vulnerable populations. Similar to selecting 
suppliers, companies can also generate positive or negative social impact in how they 
select customers or develop a target demographic. Companies can develop business 
models to enable socially conscious access to their products. For example, a B2B 
company (that is, one with businesses as clients, rather than individual consumers), can 
prioritize socially conscious businesses — whether that is because they are 
environmentally conscious, prioritize gender or racial representation, improve 
population health outcomes, empower employees, or have some other positive social 
impact. Similarly, how a company capitalizes itself and who it chooses as an investor 
can have huge impact on its subsequent decision-making. A socially-minded investor 
could have much different influence than one focused solely on short-term profit, for 
example. 
 55 Take, for example, Chipotle and Patagonia, which have shifted entire supply 
chains with their decisions to source local, antibiotic-free meat and other ingredients, 
and organic cotton, respectively, and the incentives they provided suppliers and farmers 
to help them be able to transition to do so. REINHARDT ET AL., supra note 16, at 4; Erica 
Shaffer, Chipotle Supply Chain Partners Form ‘Virtual Farmers’ Market,’ MEAT + POULTRY 
(June 30, 2020), https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/23387-chipotle-supply-chain-
partners-form-virtual-farmers-market [https://perma.cc/M2AP-E8MX]. 
 56 For example, Plum Organic has focused on the health of its product line of 
organic baby foods. Food Philosophy, PLUM ORGANICS, https://www.plumorganics.com/ 
resource_center/plum-organics-food-philosophy/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/TC67-82KM]. Danone has increased its focus on health over the past 
few decades, divesting unhealthier product lines, reformulating existing products (such 
as reducing sugar in its yogurts), and acquiring and investing in future healthier product 
lines. CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., DANONE NORTH AMERICA: THE 
WORLD’S LARGEST B CORPORATION (2018). 
 57 For example, Ben & Jerry’s has acknowledged its shortcomings “as a mostly white 
company based in a mostly white state,” and has taken actions to increase diversity in 
its recruiting and to financially support racial justice initiatives. It also publicly 
supported the Black Lives Matter movement in 2016, years before it was popularly 
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worker burnout and commodification through improved employee 
treatment and policies.58 In addition, employees generally prefer to 
work at companies with objectives beyond profit, leading to better 
workplace fulfillment and labor outcomes.59 These companies also have 
the benefit of tailoring their approaches to the unique needs of their 
own firms and industries, and the ability to more nimbly experiment 
and better respond to feedback in real time.60 This experimentation can 
yield valuable data on which approaches prove more or less effective. 
Such fine-grained tailoring to individual circumstances can be difficult 
for external laws or programs to accomplish, but more readily 
achievable for companies.61 
 
accepted, and took what as probably the strongest company response to the killing of 
George Floyd in its statement, “We Must Dismantle White Supremacy.” See Ben & 
Jerry’s: Educating Themselves and Others About Racial Equity, B THE CHANGE (Feb. 14, 
2019), https://bthechange.com/ben-jerrys-educating-themselves-and-others-about-
racial-equity-929866bec474 [https://perma.cc/B5H8-6HJF]; We Must Dismantle White 
Supremacy, BEN & JERRY’S, https://www.benjerry.com/about-us/media-center/dismantle-
white-supremacy (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/46H7-7SRT]. 
 58 Of course, offering for-profit companies as part of a solution to labor inequality and 
worker commodification is not intended to replace robust labor and employment laws. 
For-profit socially conscious activity occurs above and beyond the floor these laws set.  
 59 In fact, employees frequently trade lower salaries to engage in work with a sense 
of purpose. This preference is even more pronounced among Millennials and 
Generation Z, and will only increase as these generations increasingly comprise the 
workforce. See Hu & Hirsh, supra note 15, at 1; Achor et al., supra note 15; see also 
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG 
Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 102 
(2020) (explaining millennial workers indicated that the primary purpose of businesses 
should be improving society, rather than generating profit); Gelles, supra note 1 (stating 
that employees took lower salaries to work at Etsy because it provided meaningful 
work). 
 60 For example, Danone recently administered a company survey seeking employee 
feedback, to which it received an astounding eighty percent response rate. As a result 
of that feedback, it conferred voting rights on employees, giving every employee a share 
in the company, and it created twenty-six employee volunteer representatives to offer 
feedback and meet with the board each year. Cassie Werber, What Happens When You 
Ask 100,000 Employees to Help Run a Multinational Company, QUARTZ WORK (May 21, 
2019), https://qz.com/work/1618038/danone-asked-100000-employees-to-help-run-a-
multinational-company/ [https://perma.cc/6DUK-D692]. To take another example, one 
startup in the sample has one-on-one meetings between the founders and the employees 
to get honest feedback, and also administers various short surveys at periodic intervals 
to get employee feedback. It changes company policy in real time in response to the 
feedback received. See Aguirre, supra note 16. 
 61 Multiple objective companies can achieve these outcomes by leveraging 
economies of scope. Economies of scope leverage efficiencies formed by variety, rather 
than by volume. See Panzar & Willig, supra note 14, at 268; see also Kaplow & Shavell, 
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Companies with objectives beyond profit are also particularly 
attractive because they can achieve these improved social outcomes 
without requiring much costly additional legislation to incentivize or 
penalize company action, for example through employment law, 
environmental law, or tax law.62 Unlike many nonprofit charities or 
government initiatives, they also offer the benefit of being ultimately 
self-sustaining through revenue, rather than primarily reliant on 
donations, grants, or government support for long-term survival. This 
Paper does not aim to suggest that for-profit companies replace robust 
government or charitable activity to solve societal problems — even 
companies with objectives beyond profit.63 Rather, it recognizes the 
powerful role these businesses can play to complement government and 
charitable activity to help solve critical and intractable social problems.  
C. The Scaling Up Problem 
Companies with social purpose objectives aim to maximize social 
impact alongside economic impact, just as traditional businesses aim to 
maximize profit.64 To do so, many of these companies attempt to scale 
up, which can be defined as “spreading excellence within an 
organization as it grows.”65 Scaling up is a challenging prospect for any 
company, requiring it to maintain organizational excellence while 
growing substantially larger at a rapid pace.66 It is an elusive topic that 
is ripe for further study in general.67  
But for companies with objectives beyond profit, scaling up seems to 
present an even more acute challenge. Unlike traditional businesses, 
 
supra note 14, at 667 (noting the inefficiency of legal regulations in achieving social 
outcomes).  
 62 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 667. 
 63 See Culley & Horwitz, supra note 50, at 1; Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement, 
supra note 50, at 528-29. 
 64 Filipe Santos, Anne-Claire Pache & Christoph Birkholz, Making Hybrids Work: 
Aligning Business Models and Organizational Design for Social Enterprises, 57 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 36, 38 (2015). 
 65 Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 182 (“Without scaling, firms 
cannot reach a large number of beneficiaries and have a substantial social impact”); 
Dean A. Shepherd & Holger Patzelt, A Call for Research on the Scale of Organizations and 
the Scaling of Social Impact, ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 9-11 (2020); see 
also ROBERT I. SUTTON & HUGGY RAO, SCALING UP EXCELLENCE – GETTING TO MORE 
WITHOUT SETTLING FOR LESS-CROWN BUSINESS 8 (2014). 
 66 See SUTTON & RAO, supra note 65 at 3-7; Shepherd & Patzelt, supra note 65, at 1-11. 
 67 See Shepherd & Patzelt, supra note 65, at 1-11. See generally SUTTON & RAO, supra 
note 65 (discussing the challenges and common mistakes associated with properly 
scaling a business). 
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companies with social purpose objectives face an additional challenge 
of achieving scale (and mobilizing the resources required to do so) in a 
context of weaker prospects of financial sustainability.68 They face 
greater struggles accessing equity capital,69 and grapple with an absence 
of managerial blueprints to inform their scaling up process. Indeed, 
scholars in a small but growing literature in scaling social 
entrepreneurship have found that while many for-profit ventures 
pursuing social and commercial objectives have been started, few have 
successfully scaled up, “making scaling one of the most important yet 
least understood topics in social entrepreneurship.”70 It is difficult to 
quantify the extent of this scaling up problem, in light of the nascent 
literature on the subject and difficulty in collecting systematic data.71 
But preliminary field research conducted in this area over the past 
three years bears out these findings. This field research has consisted of 
fifty-six interviews with respondents from fourteen companies of 
various sizes, stages, and orientations to social purpose and profit.72 All 
of the companies either pursue social purpose alongside profit, or have 
acquired such companies.73 The dataset includes early-stage startups, 
late-stage startups, privately scaled companies, private equity, and 
large-scale publicly traded companies.74  
Results from this field research underscore a perception among 
practitioners that successfully scaling up social ventures presents a 
significant problem. For example, one former General Counsel at a 
Fortune 500 company described the difficulty of acquiring small, 
purpose-driven companies.75 Among other things, he referenced their 
under-capitalization, outsourced manufacturing, attempts to go “too far 
 
 68 Santos et al., supra note 64, at 53.  
 69 Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 172. 
 70 “In the social entrepreneurship literature, scholars have noted that while many 
social ventures have been started, few have successfully experienced scaling, thus 
making scaling one of the most important yet least understood topics in social 
entrepreneurship” Shepherd & Patzelt, supra note 65, at 8. 
 71 Shepherd & Patzlet, supra note 65, at 1-11; see e.g., Smith & Besharov, supra note 
18 (describing their data methodology). For example, there is no central repository of 
IPOs or acquisitions of companies that pursue social purpose and profit objectives, nor 
a repository of formerly certified B-Corps. Additional research to ascertain the 
magnitude and contours of the problem is important, and is the subject of ongoing work 
and data collection I am conducting, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 72 See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 73 See id.  
 74 See id.  
 75 See id.  
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too fast,” and lack of staffing, resources, and technical expertise.76 He 
underscored how these challenges are not carefully enough considered 
in acquisitions and post-merger integrations, complicating the 
process.77 
Another C-Suite Executive at one well-known publicly traded food 
company explained his company’s inability to successfully scale-up 
acquired startups with objectives beyond profit. He described the 
disappointing results from its three most recent acquisitions. In his 
opinion, the first startup lost its social purpose objectives post-
acquisition and scale up, and would, he anticipated, lose its B-Corp 
certification when it came time for re-certification. The second startup 
stagnated financially, and was eventually sold at a loss. The third startup 
was flourishing at the present moment — in his view because the parent 
company left the acquired company alone as long as the brand remained 
financially lucrative. But he predicted that as soon as the relevant 
product category became more competitive, the parent company would 
strip the social purposes in an attempt to drive growth.78 
To illustrate the phenomenon in another context, one privately scaled 
company described its unusual (and largely unprecedented) journey to 
buyout its venture capital investors in order to preserve its objectives 
beyond profit. Despite having selected socially conscious venture 
capital investors, the startup still struggled to scale while maintaining 
its objectives beyond profit, and perceived the only way to do so was to 
buyout the investors and pursue a path of slower, more sustainable 
growth (rather than an IPO or acquisition).79 Similarly, another startup 
still in its early stages struggled to access capital from investors who 
aligned with its social purpose objectives alongside profit. So far, it has 
relied on downplaying its social purpose objectives in investor settings, 
 
 76 See id. (“Acquiring small healthy purposeful companies complicates the process. 
That’s a big factor. These are small companies, they are under-capitalized, they are 
outsourcing manufacturing. They may be serving 100 different clients. What are the 
challenges in truly scaling up? These issues are not carefully considered. . . . They go 
too far too fast, they may not have the staffing, resources, technical expertise to really 
maintain what you have to maintain as far as food safety is concerned and that is a zero-
tolerance oversight system. Even though FDA is historically reactive, FSMA gave it tools 
to apply proactively. Hazard-oriented food systems are in place. Startups usually have 
nothing but the bare minimum. But when they’re acquired by a multinational, the stakes 
ratchet up.”).  
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. 
 79 Joel Gascoigne, We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It, BUFFER 
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://buffer.com/resources/buying-out-investors/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4PUS-TB55]. 
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but is realizing it must further confront how best to access capital to 
scale while maintaining its multiple objectives over the long-term.80 
Although additional empirical research is needed, these examples 
from both the management literature and preliminary field research 
suggest the acute difficulty of scaling up a social venture, despite the 
corporate law and private ordering frameworks available to enable the 
existence of these firms in the first instance. 
II. CURRENT OPTIONS IN BUSINESS LAW AND CONTRACT LAW 
Companies that articulate purposes beyond profit may privately order 
themselves in a number of different ways to achieve their objectives, 
using both business law and contract law. A company can choose to 
incorporate in a traditional form, such as a general corporation, and 
memorialize its multiple objectives in its charter or through informal 
commitments. Or it can choose to incorporate as a PBC, a legal form 
that mandates the pursuit of social purpose and profit simultaneously. 
And regardless of how a company chooses to legally incorporate, it can 
also privately contract to achieve its multiple objectives, including with 
stakeholders or beneficiaries, or through third-party B-Corp 
certification. 
A. The Traditional General Corporation 
A company with objectives beyond profit may elect a traditional form 
such as a general corporation or limited liability company (“LLC”) and 
pursue its multiple objectives by memorializing them in its charter or 
adopting certain organizational practices.81 These organizational 
practices could include treatment of employees, customers, suppliers, 
 
 80 See Aguirre, supra note 16. 
 81 Delaware refers to the traditional corporate form as a “general corporation.” 
Although there is variation in nomenclature across states, this paper uses the Delaware 
term of general corporation for simplicity. General corporations further elect a separate 
tax status — generally either C-Corporation or S-Corporation — which is not a legal 
entity but an IRS designation. In addition, multiple objective companies may also elect 
to form one of several other less common forms, such as a cooperative, partnership, 
low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”) or one of several other for-profit forms 
that exist in addition to the more common general corporation or LLC, though these 
have had little uptake. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms of Social Enterprise, 
62 EMORY L.J. 681, 683 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag 
with Fly Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 
1506-08 (2013); Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment, supra note 13, at 89; 
Culley & Horwitz, supra note 50, at 4.  
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or the environment.82 For example, a company might have a deep 
commitment to employee welfare that it expresses through internal 
practices of organizational democracy or worker empowerment.83 It 
may seek out ethical supply chains, or work to reduce its carbon 
footprint, or pursue racial and ethnic equity in its hiring or selling 
practices.84 It might develop products to meet its social purpose 
standards, such as a food company with a portfolio that meets a baseline 
nutritional profile, or an environmental apparel company that develops 
product lines to source organic (environmentally friendly) cotton.85 
These organizational practices may not be legally enforceable, but can 
nonetheless reflect a robust underlying commitment to the pursuit of 
social purpose and profit as core organizational goals.  
There is robust debate in corporate law scholarship over whether 
traditional corporate forms like the general corporation legally permit 
the pursuit of objectives beyond profit, or require the pursuit of the 
single profit objective.86 Most standard views of corporate law today 
 
 82 Take, for example Danone’s commitment to developing healthier products, or 
Patagonia’s commitment to developing product lines with organic cotton. Both product 
lines require additional research and innovation, and frequently additional financial 
investment to achieve. 
 83 See Julie Battilana, Julie Yen & Emilie Aguirre, Placing Both Humans and the Planet 
at the Core of a Sustainable Economy: On the Need to Prioritize and Empower Workers in 
Companies, in HANDBOOK ON THE BUSINESS OF SUSTAINABILITY: THE ORGANIZATION, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND THE PRACTICE OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (forthcoming 2021). 
 84 See, e.g., MARQUIS ET AL., supra note 56 (describing Danone’s business model); 
REINHARDT ET AL., supra note 55 (explaining Patagonia’s prioritization of social and 
environmental goals). 
 85 These examples all derive from real companies, such as Patagonia, Danone, Ben 
& Jerry’s and several other companies. See MARQUIS ET AL., supra note 56 (referencing 
Danone); REINHARDT ET AL., supra note 55 (referencing Patagonia); see also James E. 
Austin & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Can the Virtuous Mouse and the Wealthy Elephant 
Live Happily Ever After?, 51 CAL. MGMT. REV. 77, 81-84 (2008); David Marchese, Ben & 
Jerry’s Radical Ice Cream Dreams, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2020/07/27/magazine/ben-jerry-interview.html [https://perma.cc/NYX7-2R7C]. 
 86 Theories of the firm have developed over the past two centuries in both 
economics and law to attempt to explain why for-profit firms exist and how they 
function. One strand represents the more widely held view today that for-profit firms 
exist to pursue a single profit objective and to maximize shareholder wealth. This camp 
derives from classical theories of the firm and their progeny. The second camp pushes 
back against the classical theories of the firm, asserting that for-profit firms exist to 
pursue social objectives alongside profit. These theoretical tensions perhaps 
unsurprisingly give way to doctrinal tensions in business law. See Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972); Anthony Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of 
‘Team’ Production of Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2015); R.H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937); Oliver Hart, An 
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adopt some version of a shareholder primacy and shareholder value 
model, maintaining that shareholders are the principals for whom 
corporate governance is organized, that they exercise ultimate control 
over the corporation, and that maximization of shareholder wealth is 
the only proper goal of the corporation.87 But some more recent 
developments in economic and legal theories of the firm push back 
against this conception, departing from the classical view that for-profit 
firms exist solely to pursue a single profit objective.88 
These underlying tensions in theories of the firm translate into 
doctrinal tensions in business law. These tensions create uncertainty 
over what corporate law permits and requires of traditionally 
incorporated firms that seek to pursue objectives beyond profit.89 
 
Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (1989); 
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976); Luigi Zingales, In Search 
of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1624 (2000); Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. 
 87 See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563, 565, 568 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1989); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
440-41 (2001); see also Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 
TEX. L. REV. 863, 864 (2020). 
 88 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 296, 303 n.138 (1999); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, 
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 
247, 248 (2017); see also Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the 
False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 107-114 (2006) [hereinafter 
Venture Capital, Agency Costs]; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 734 (2005); Fisch & Sepe, supra note 87, at 863 (arguing 
that in practice, the corporate world has moved on from traditional confrontational 
models of the corporation, debating managerialism and shareholder power, to a 
collaboration model of the corporation, emphasizing insider-shareholder 
collaboration); Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 
38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619, 645 (2015) [hereinafter Team Production Theory]. 
 89 Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 309, 324 (2011) (citing Delaware cases for the proposition that “U.S. boards 
generally . . . have explicit latitude to consider the interests of other stakeholders, such 
as employees and creditors, in deciding how to respond to a hostile bid”); Lyman 
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate 
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432 (2013) (arguing that Delaware law is unsettled on 
the question of whether corporations are required to advance the long-term interests of 
stockholders); see also Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s 
“Women on Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 493, 509 (2019) (arguing that California SB 826 requiring female representation 
on boards reflects a broader conception of corporate purpose and responsibilities 
beyond shareholder primacy, and citing further additional examples). 
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Several seminal cases in business law seem to suggest that it requires 
for-profit firms to pursue a single profit objective and therefore 
maximize shareholder wealth, while others stand for the opposite 
proposition.90 
Business law is therefore muddled on the question of corporate 
purpose, and whether firms must pursue a single profit objective.91 It is 
unclear for both scholars and practitioners whether and how companies 
may legally pursue objectives beyond profit if they adopt a traditional 
corporate form such as the general corporation. 
B. The Public Benefit Corporation 
In light of muddled understanding around traditional general 
corporations, business law attempts to provide an explicit solution for 
 
 90 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of 
Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure 
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768, 
771 (2015) (writing that “Revlon could not have been more clear that directors of a for-
profit corporation must at all times pursue the best interest of the corporation’s 
stockholders, and that the decision highlighted the instrumental nature of other 
constituencies and interests” and stating that “a clear-eyed look at the law of 
corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their discretion, directors 
must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken 
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare”); see also Lynn 
A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 
(2008). But see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); LYNN STOUT, 
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 30-31 (2012) (arguing that Revlon is the “exception that 
proves the rule” and “it is only when a public corporation is about to stop being a public 
corporation that directors lose the protection of the business judgment rule and must 
embrace shareholder wealth as their only goal”); Elhauge, supra note 88, at 772, 775 
(explaining why profit maximization proponents’ reliance on Dodge v. Ford is 
misplaced). An example from a case outside of business law is also informative. In 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that a closely held for-profit company 
was exempt from complying with regulations to which its owners religiously object. 
The Court’s recognition that a closely held for-profit firm could claim religious beliefs 
pushes back against the notion that for-profit firms are and must be strict profit 
maximizers. 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & The First 
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 263 (2015); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Margaret M. Blair 
& Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1673, 1729-30 (2015).  
 91 See Elizabeth Pollman, Social and Asocial Enterprise, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018). 
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companies that wish to pursue social purpose and profit 
simultaneously: public benefit corporation law.92 This legislation has 
been adopted in thirty-seven jurisdictions including Delaware.93 It 
facially requires companies that opt in to pursue social purpose 
alongside profit, though provides few enforcement mechanisms. 
Public benefit corporation legislation imposes several stated 
requirements on firms that elect to incorporate as PBCs. First, it 
requires firms to pursue a “general public benefit,” meaning they must 
pursue social purposes beyond profit, and take account of stakeholders 
beyond shareholders.94 In addition, Delaware PBCs are required to 
enumerate a “specific public benefit” in their charters. Specific public 
benefit is defined as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) 
on one or more categories of persons, entities, communities, or interests 
(other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, 
but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, culture, economic, 
educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific, or 
technological nature.”95 Most jurisdictions mandate an annual report 
detailing the corporation’s efforts to pursue the public benefit. The 
report must be made publicly available and use a third-party standard 
of the company’s choosing to track its progress.96 In Delaware, PBCs are 
only required to publish a report every two years, and only to 
 
 92 See id. In most states, this law is referred to as “benefit corporation law.” Because 
Delaware uses the term “public benefit corporation,” for the sake of simplicity, this 
paper will use the term PBC to refer to any company legally incorporated in any 
jurisdiction as a benefit corporation. Most jurisdictions have substantially similar 
benefit corporation laws, drawn from the Model Benefit Corporation Law, though 
Delaware PBC law has some notable divergence, which will be noted. 
 93 See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status?state=wisconsin (last visited Dec. 25, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/F5S4-9LKY] [hereinafter State by State Status]. Definitive figures are 
difficult to tabulate, because each state’s Secretary of State tracks data on incorporation 
differently, but best estimates suggest that there are over 5000 benefit corporations in 
the United States today. This number is high in absolute terms, but quite low in relative 
terms compared to the number of total businesses in the US today. See Find a Benefit 
Corp, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp?field_bcorp 
_certified_value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort_by=title&sort_order=ASC&op=
Go (last visited Dec. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W6Y4-BGQV]. 
 94 Reiser, supra note 22, at 597-98; see REISER & DEAN, supra note 22, at 53. The 
thirty-seven states with benefit corporation statutes includes the District of Columbia. 
See State by State Status, supra note 93.  
 95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (a), (b) (2020); see also MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. 
§ 102 (2014).  
 96 See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401(a), 402(b).  
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shareholders and not the general public.97 PBCs are not required to use 
a third-party standard as part of their self-evaluation.98 
PBC legislation provides companies that opt in with some important 
benefits, but it lacks meaningful enforcement mechanisms, 
undermining its utility as a solution for companies that articulate 
objectives beyond profit.99 Enforcement mechanisms in PBC legislation 
are both narrow and weak. They are narrow because they only grant 
shareholders — and not third-party stakeholders — a private right of 
action to enforce the social purpose.100 Despite imposing a duty to 
consider stakeholder interests, PBC legislation does not afford 
stakeholders an accompanying enforcement right.101 They are weak 
because they provide an extremely low standard for both disclosure and 
liability. PBCs are only required to publish an annual report that uses a 
self-chosen third-party standard to assess performance.102 In Delaware, 
the bar is even lower. Reports are only required every two years, are not 
required to be made publicly available, and are not required to use even 
a self-chosen third-party standard for assessment.103 Early data 
suggested an extremely low compliance rate with the reporting 
 
 97 tit. 8, § 366(b) (2020).  
 98 Id. § 366(c).  
 99 The benefit corporation legal form does serve several important purposes. It helps 
confer legitimacy to these organizations, helping attract investors, employees, and 
customers, and thus enabling their survival. The penalties for defying socially legitimate 
categories are high, creating high barriers for firms outside mainstream social 
conventions. This new form and its uptake helps bolster the success of individual multi-
objective firms and the multiple objective social movement generally. See Ezra W. 
Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount, 
104 AM. J. SOC. 1398, 1400-01 (1999). Occupying this new category may even help 
propel these firms to even greater success. Organizations that can successfully navigate 
hybridity and occupy multiple categories can ultimately garner even more social and 
material support through their ability to leverage both of their “institutional logics” 
(social purpose and profit). But they can only do so when their perceived legitimacy in 
both worlds is secure. See Julie Battilana & Matthew Lee, Advancing Research on Hybrid 
Organizing – Insights from the Study of Social Enterprises, 8 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 397, 
410 (2014); Battilana et al., On Hybrids and Hybrid Organizing, supra note 33, at 128-62; 
Matthew S. Kraatz & Emily S. Block, Organizational Implications of Institutional 
Pluralism, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM, 243-75; Pache 
& Santos, supra note 18, at 972. 
 100 In Delaware, shareholders must hold at least two percent of the PBC’s shares to 
bring a lawsuit, meaning the requirement is not nominal. If the PBC is publicly traded, 
shareholders must hold at least $2 million in market value to bring a lawsuit. At present, 
there is only one publicly traded PBC, making this requirement largely moot to date. 
 101 See BRAKEMAN REISER & DEAN, supra note 22; Brakeman Reiser, supra note 22, at 
604-06.  
 102 See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2014).  
 103 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2020).  
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requirement, and for those that do comply, the reports are frequently so 
skimpy as to be of little use.104  
PBC legislation also does not prescribe a hierarchy of purposes or 
stakeholders in defining directors’ duties. Instead, Delaware PBC law 
explicitly provides that directors will be considered to have met their 
duties if they acted in a way that is “informed and disinterested and not 
such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.”105 It 
is likely that courts in other jurisdictions that have not explicitly 
provided a legislative standard for liability would apply the business 
judgment rule and largely defer to managerial discretion. PBC 
legislation may therefore serve to widen managerial discretion even 
further and insulate managerial decision-making, rather than enforce 
the pursuit of multiple objectives beyond profit.106 
C. Private Contracting and the Certified B-Corp 
Regardless of how they legally incorporate, companies that articulate 
objectives beyond profit may also privately contract to achieve their 
multiple objectives, including with stakeholders or beneficiaries, or 
through attaining third-party certification such as a B-Corp. For 
example, a company with both social purpose and profit objectives 
might voluntarily contract with employees to provide them with pro-
social benefits or higher wages.107 It might contract with suppliers to 
meet higher environmental or social standards.108 And it might contract 
with investors or creditors to meet certain environmental, social, or 
 
 104 See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 
34 (2015) (finding an eight percent compliance rate among benefit corporations in 
Hawaii, California, New York and Virginia from 2014 and prior).  
 105 tit. 8, § 365(b). 
 106 There is also concern that by carving out a special status for firms that pursue 
social purpose, this legislation harmfully perpetuates the notion that standard for-profit 
firms cannot or should not pursue social purpose alongside profit. See BRAKMAN REISER 
& DEAN, supra note 22, at 23; Brakeman Reiser, supra note 22, at 599-600.  
 107 For example, one startup in the sample allows equity options not only to its 
employees but even to its contractors, including those overseas — a very unusual move, 
but one that signals to its employees that they are valued and respected. See Aguirre, 
supra note 16. 
 108 For example, in Danone’s RESPECT program, “all the direct suppliers of certain 
categories, such as raw ingredients, and bigger suppliers in other categories, such as 
Services & Goods, undergo a rigorous process of assessment of their social, 
environmental and ethical performance that increases reliability of the supply chain, 
conserves our planet’s natural resources, and protects the people who work for and with 
us.” Responsible Company Practices, DANONE, https://www.danone.com/impact/health/ 
responsible-company-practices.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
4SSQ-Q59V]. 
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governance (“ESG”) terms in exchange for capital.109 These contractual 
arrangements attempt to create enforceable commitments to the pursuit 
of objectives beyond profit, which can help memorialize internal 
organizational practices and organizational goals. 
Companies with objectives beyond profit can also elect to certify as 
B-Corps — considered the highest current third-party standard for the 
pursuit of social purpose in business.110 This certification — is 
administered by a third-party nonprofit organization called B-Lab — 
and subjects companies to voluntary, rigorous standards of conduct that 
attempt to assess a company’s “entire social and environmental 
performance.”111 This assessment spans several dimensions, including 
a company’s impact on workers, suppliers, customers, community, and 
environment, as well as its governance and transparency.112 To achieve 
B-Corp certification, a company must score at least eighty points out of 
two-hundred on a comprehensive assessment.113 It includes periodic 
company auditing and requires recertification every two years.114 
B-Corp certification provides many important benefits, including 
subjecting companies to in-depth and rigorous third-party verification. 
Certification requires mobilizing significant company resources to 
achieve, both in terms of financial investment and employee time. This 
process helps ensure that certified companies meaningfully commit to 
the pursuit of social purpose alongside profit. But because it is voluntary 
and rigorous, and requires sustained effort and resources to maintain, 
the B-Corp certification is also easily lost.115 
 
 109 For example, Danone contracted for a €2 billion Positive Incentive Loan that 
provided favorable loan terms in reliance on its commitment to ESG goals. Danone’s 
Positive Incentive Financing Strategy, BNP PARIBAS (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://cib.bnpparibas.com/sustain/danone-s-positive-incentive-financing-strategy_a-3-
2238.html [https://perma.cc/V86B-URLK]. 
 110 See Certification, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/certification (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C4NH-XEKF]. 
 111 See id. 
 112 B-Lab has tailored the assessment process according to both company industry 
and company size. Id.; see also The B Impact Score, Frequently Asked Questions, B IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT, https://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/frequently-asked-questions/ 
the-b-impact-score (last visited Dec. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PP62-SQVJ] 
[hereinafter B Impact Score]. 
 113 Certification Requirements, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/ 
certification/meet-the-requirements (last visited Dec. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9SU3-
G48S]; see also B Impact Score, supra note 112.  
 114 Certification Requirements, supra note 113; see also B Impact Score, supra note 112. 
 115 See, e.g., Marc Gunther, B Corps: Sustainability Will Be Shaped by the Market, Not 
Corporate Law, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
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All of these private ordering frameworks provide some means for 
companies to pursue their objectives beyond profit. But these means are 
limited and prove particularly unsatisfactory when these companies 
with objectives beyond profit seek to scale up.  
III. THREE AVENUES TO SCALING UP AND THE LOSS OF OBJECTIVES 
BEYOND PROFIT 
Companies with objectives beyond profit can pursue several avenues 
to scale up, including most commonly going public, getting acquired, 
or private growth. Each of these avenues to scaling up is associated with 
losses of both strategic and managerial control, which consistently lead 
to the loss of the multiple objectives. The loss of strategic control is a 
problem of dispersed equity that reduces high-level strategic oversight. 
The loss of managerial control is a size problem that reduces day-to-day 
managerial oversight. Business law fails to provide a meaningful 
commitment mechanism to counter these losses. 
A. Scaling Up with Outside Equity: IPO and Acquisition 
This subpart describes the two most common avenues to scaling up: 
going public and getting acquired. It explains why both avenues often 
result in a loss of strategic and managerial control no matter how the 
company is incorporated or privately ordered. It argues that these losses 
lead in turn to a loss of the pursuit of multiple objectives post-scale.  
Both an IPO and an acquisition entail accessing outside equity capital 
— meaning the company exchanges ownership shares essentially in 
return for cash.116 If a company pursues an IPO, it will generally offer 
its shares on a public exchange, making them available to most any 
individual or institutional investor.117 If the company pursues an 
acquisition, it will be purchased by another company or a private equity 
firm.118 Particularly given a declining IPO landscape, an increasing 
 
business/b-corps-markets-corporate-law [https://perma.cc/QFN7-8XZA] (discussing 
the role benefit corporations play in sustainable business practices). 
 116 See Jason Fernando, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA, 
investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp (last updated Nov. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
39WQ-HMYN]; see also John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The 
Problem of Twelve 4 (HARV. PUB. L., Working Paper No. 19-07 4, Sept. 20, 2018). 
 117 See Fernando, supra note 116. A company’s securities may also be traded over-
the-counter, rather than listed on a formal exchange, but this distinction is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 118 See Will Kenton, Acquisition, INVESTOPEDIA, investopedia.com/terms/a/ 
acquisition.asp (last updated Jun. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SX82-MFQC]. The IPO 
is usually a riskier approach with both greater potential financial upside and downside. 
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number of firms, including firms that articulate objectives beyond 
profit, now choose to pursue the acquisition route.119 
Scaling is an extremely difficult task for any company, and there are 
several advantages to seeking outside equity capital when doing so.120 
First, it provides the considerable infusion of capital necessary to 
rapidly operate the business on a much larger scale, resulting in greater 
social and economic impact.121 Companies usually cannot generate 
anywhere near the amount of capital necessary to scale up through 
revenue alone.122 It also has the advantage of providing liquidity for 
founders and early investors.123 Finally, equity capital also usually 
brings an infusion of expertise on how to operate a business on a larger 
scale, either from those who help take the company public or from the 
acquiring company. This expertise includes, for example, guidance on 
how to scale up production rapidly, access to extended distribution 
channels and suppliers, and legal support. 
But outside equity capital also generally results in dispersed 
ownership and dilution of founder equity, frequently leading to a loss 
of voting control and therefore loss of control over electing the board.124 
 
An acquisition has less potential financial upside, but also carries less risk. The 
dispersed equity problem can also occur even earlier for start-ups, for example, when 
they give up equity in the company to attain venture capital funding. For firms without 
private sources of capital — say from family, friends, or an angel investor — this choice 
can feel particularly acute at earlier stages, highlighting that social equity concerns also 
arise through the current system. 
 119 See Elisabeth De Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of 
the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 471-72 (2017); Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & 
Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 49 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1663, 1663 (2013) (noting that the average was 311 US IPOs per year from 1980–2000, 
whereas the average was 102 US IPOs per year for 2001–2009). 
 120 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-Profit 
Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 308-09 (2013). 
 121 See Fernando, supra note 116.  
 122 This process of growing on earned income alone is also known as 
“bootstrapping.” See MALENE ALLEYNE, CAMILLE CANON, AMELIA EVANS, YICHEN FENG, 
NATHAN SCHNEIDER & MARA ZEPEDA, MEDIA ENTER. DESIGN LAB & ZEBRAS UNITE, EXIT TO 
COMMUNITY: A COMMUNITY PRIMER 14 (2020), https://www.colorado.edu/lab/medlab/ 
sites/default/files/attached-files/exittocommunityprimer-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/44VC-
P77S]. 
 123 For more on debt financing, see infra Part IV.1 and see also Fernando, supra note 116.  
 124 See Robert P. Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2015); Coates, supra note 116, at 4; infra Part IV.A.1. 
A company can use blunt private ordering instruments like multi- or dual-class shares 
to attempt to retain strategic control over the company after securing outside equity 
capital. Many companies, such as Facebook and Snap, increasingly use this approach to 
protect their founders’ idiosyncratic strategic desires. This approach of broadly 
stripping shareholders of rights is not well-tailored to the aim of retaining a company’s 
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Because the board sets overall company strategy, including hiring 
officers such as the CEO, the loss of control over the board translates 
into a loss of high-level strategic control over the company. Whether a 
company retains its multiple objectives is then left to the discretion of 
its outside investors.125 
This loss of strategic control makes it relatively easy to undo ex ante 
private ordering attempts to protect the pursuit of objectives beyond 
profit. Multiple objectives memorialized in the charter are easily 
removed or ignored; the PBC legislative mandate is largely 
unenforceable in practice; contracts to do social good can easily be 
undone; and B-Corp certification is easy to let expire.126 For example, 
Etsy took special measures to safeguard its social purpose after going 
public.127 It marketed shares to smaller investors and Etsy sellers and 
sought to concentrate ownership in a smaller than usual number of 
institutional investors to protect against short-termism it saw as 
antithetical to its pursuit of social purpose and profit.128 Yet activist 
investors still targeted Etsy and used their newfound strategic influence 
to elect new board members who redirected the company toward 
pursuit of profit.129 Parallel examples abound for acquired companies 
 
multiple objectives, broadly removing shareholder rights that extend well beyond 
protecting the pursuit of multiple objectives. In addition, there is increasing push back 
— including from the SEC — about using this approach in publicly traded companies. 
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 596-99 (2017); Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The 
Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (2019); Andrew Winden & Andrew 
Baker, Dual-Class Index Exclusion 11 (Rock Center for Corp. Governance, Working 
Paper Series No. 233, 2018). 
 125 See, e.g., Coates, supra note 116, at 3-4 (describing how outside investors such as 
VCs traditionally have selected boards that become self-replacing for firms that go 
public, even though boards are nominally elected by shareholders, and how modern 
trends have given way to increased concentration of ownership among institutional 
investors such as index funds that now wield considerable influence). 
 126 Corporate law, including in Delaware, grants significant freedom to directors to 
amend corporate bylaws (the core governing documents of the company) unilaterally 
as part of their authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. See infra 
Part IV.A.2. Companies that scale using outside equity capital and lose their controlling 
stake in the company therefore often lose control over charter amendments, which must 
be approved by shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020); Albert H. Choi 
& Geeyoung Min, Contractarian Theory and Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 15 (2018).  
 127 See Gelles, supra note 1; see also Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1.  
 128 Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1. 
 129 See Gelles, supra note 1; Mitchell, supra note 1; Peters, supra note 1. See infra Part 
IV.A.1 for a more in-depth discussion of the limitations of dual-class stock in solving 
this problem. 
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that attempted to protect their social purposes after being purchased, 
but fell short.130 
In addition, any scaling — whether through outside equity capital or 
otherwise — is also associated with a loss of managerial control. The 
increased size of the company means founders or early officers lose the 
ability to make day-to-day decisions for every aspect of the business, 
complicating retention of the objectives beyond profit. For example, 
they no longer personally select employees, outside investors, suppliers, 
distributors, and customers. They lose close ties and personal 
relationships with all of these stakeholders. Scaled companies must put 
into place distributed infrastructure systems to accommodate the 
exponential increases in production. They must transition from a world 
where they frequently know and trust their suppliers personally, to 
establishing robust and reliable global supply chains with suppliers they 
will never meet. They must shift from familiar and tested regional 
distribution channels to unknown national and international 
distribution channels for their products. They must comply with a host 
of new laws, both domestically and globally, and contend with much 
greater exposure to legal liability on a global forum. And they must 
delegate the hiring of a significant number of new employees to 
accomplish this work, while trying to maintain the underlying processes 
that led to their smaller-scale success. 
 
 130 Take, for example, the Kashi example after it was acquired by Kellogg’s, and a 
number of other similar examples. See Kesmodel & Gasparro, supra note 11. Even the 
acquisition examples touted as successes experience mixed results. For example, Ben & 
Jerry’s attempted to memorialize its social purpose in contract in its acquisition 
negotiations with Unilever. It achieved varying degrees of success in doing so, including 
for example its independent social purpose advisory board, though within five years of 
the acquisition, many of the terms had sunsetted. It was also only upon new leadership 
at Unilever that there was renewed interest in reigniting Ben & Jerry’s social purposes. 
Lastly, it is also critical to note that this example occurred with an acquirer — Unilever 
— known to be socially conscious and, as a European company, thought to be more 
amenable to combining social purpose and profit in business. See David Marchese, supra 
note 85. In general, it is well-established that these acquisitions are extremely difficult 
to get right. See Austin & Leonard, supra note 85 (“It is precisely because [these social 
icons] are different that they are appealing. These small innovators have mastered what 
we call a ‘social technology’ — a special know-how — that embeds social values into 
their missions, production processes, product characteristics, organizational cultures, 
and relationships with their employees, their suppliers, and their consumers. This 
constellation has created distinctive value propositions and powerful brand integrity. 
The social icons have cultivated new, high-growth market segments. The big companies 
that acquire them are betting on products with high social content becoming a salient 
component of the future marketplace. . . While these special attributes make the social 
icons attractive and valuable, they are also likely to be fragile and easy to disrupt or 
destroy.”). 
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Companies that scale with outside equity capital thus highly risk the 
loss of the multiple objectives due to the losses of strategic and 
managerial control that occur at scale. Business law fails to provide a 
meaningful commitment mechanism to counter these losses, limiting 
these firms’ potential for social and economic impact, and hindering 
their abilities to privately order themselves as they wish. It also 
undermines their abilities to contract with key third-party stakeholders 
such as employees and investors. Employees make significant firm-
specific investments of their human capital, and the pursuit of 
objectives beyond profit is often a critical factor in employees’ decisions 
to join a company.131 It creates a costly employment decision for them 
if they cannot rely on the retention of the multiple objectives.132 
Whether the company is durably committed to objectives beyond profit 
over the long-term is also of critical importance to investors and lenders 
— who make significant financial investments in the firm. In fact, there 
is even evidence that some investors and lenders will give favorable 
financing terms to companies that can credibly commit to social 
purpose objectives alongside profit objectives, due to lower long-term 
risk assessments.133 The lack of a durable commitment mechanism 
undermines a company’s ability to assure prospective investors and 
employees that it will adhere to its multiple objectives over time, 
hindering its attractiveness as a contractual partner.134 
 
 131 See Hu & Hirsh, supra note 15, at 8; Achor et al., supra note 15; see also Gelles, 
supra note 1 (stating that employees took lower salaries to work at Etsy because it 
provided meaningful work). 
 132 See Russell W. Coff, Human Assets and Management Dilemmas: Coping with 
Hazards on the Road to Resource-Based Theory, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 374, 374 (1997); 
Nile W. Hatch & Jeffrey H. Dyer, Human Capital and Learning as a Source of Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1155, 1155 (2004); Yasemin Y. Kor & 
Huseyin Leblebici, How Do Interdependencies Among Human-Capital Deployment, 
Development, and Diversification Strategies Affect Firms’ Financial Performance?, 26 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 967, 967 (2005). 
 133 See BNP PARIBAS, supra note 30.  
 134 DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC 
BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 23 (2017). Consumers and the general public often 
accuse businesses that claim to pursue social purposes of engaging in mere 
“greenwashing” in an effort to increase profits. When 181 CEOs of the world’s largest 
companies issued a statement redefining the purpose of the corporation and stating that 
profit should represent but one goal of the business alongside consideration of other 
stakeholders, they were accused of attempting to avoid regulation and negative press. 
Shortly after Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest fund manager, publicly 
urged CEOs to redefine the purpose of business to include social goals and especially 
sustainability, and announced the decision to prioritize sustainability in BlackRock’s 
investment decisions, BlackRock rebuked the company Siemens over its environmental 
record but then voted to approve all management resolutions at its annual meeting, 
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B. Scaling Up Through Private Growth 
This subpart describes a third option to scale up: private growth. A 
company that chooses to scale privately forgoes outside equity capital 
and remains a closely held company — meaning the founders generally 
retain a controlling stake.135 This option has both benefits and 
drawbacks. 
Perhaps most notably, because founders retain controlling stakes in 
the company, they retain voting control, helping mitigate the loss of 
strategic control associated with attaining outside equity capital. The 
founders more reliably retain control over the board and therefore high-
level strategic oversight over the company.136 Retaining this strategic 
control makes it perhaps more likely for the founders to continue 
balancing their social purpose and profit objectives. For example, it is 
perhaps not surprising that one of the most prominent large-scale 
examples of a company that articulates objectives beyond profit, 
Patagonia, is privately held. 
But scaling privately also has several drawbacks: namely, it does not 
entirely mitigate the loss of strategic control, is still associated with a 
loss of managerial control, limits potential large-scale impact, and 
presents several barriers to widespread uptake.137 First, scaling privately 
may only partly mitigate the loss of strategic control. For example, if a 
company scales up using debt financing, although it retains voting 
rights, it can give up serious control rights over the company due to 
terms attached to creditors’ restrictive debt covenants.138 If it 
experiences cash flow problems, as is common for scaling companies, it 
 
Greenpeace Germany accused the firm of engaging in “blunt greenwashing.” See 
Attracta Mooney, Joe Miller & Peter Smith, BlackRock Rebukes Siemens on Its 
Environmental Record, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
92512bcc-48b3-11ea-aee2-9ddbdc86190d [https://perma.cc/5TA7-5N3X]; Business 
Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All 
Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/ 
business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-
that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/2W3K-LPL9]. 
 135 See James Chen, Private Company, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/p/privatecompany.asp (last updated Aug. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8472-BDJQ] 
[hereinafter Private Company]. 
 136 See id.  
 137 See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 161-62 (2019). 
 138 See infra Part IV.B.1, for more in-depth discussion of the restrictive debt 
covenants. See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the 
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1216-17 (2006); 
Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 27, at 257. 
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may experience even greater losses of control.139 In addition, scaling up 
privately is still often associated with a loss of managerial control 
because the company still grows in size, limiting managers’ ability to 
oversee its now distributed operations. And by forgoing outside equity 
capital, the company also forgoes the significant outside expertise that 
usually accompanies it, further hindering the scaling process. Staying 
private also makes it more difficult to raise the necessary capital to scale, 
which the company must do through other means, such as debt or 
revenue.140 Both of these financing alternatives present significant 
challenges, and because they are generally a smaller capital infusion, 
also limit a company’s potential scale of impact.141 
In addition, there are several barriers to widespread uptake of scaling 
privately. As a result, scaling privately may not be a viable option for 
most companies even if they wish to pursue it. First, companies may 
not be able to fully finance a scale with debt, and most will never be able 
to accrue the needed capital to scale through revenue alone at their 
earlier stages.142 In addition, most startups that seek to scale are 
venture-backed, meaning a venture capital (“VC”) firm has invested 
financially in the company and taken a non-controlling equity stake in 
return.143 Although a VC firm usually does not have majority (board) 
control over the company, it can exert significant influence with its 
minority stake through significant monitoring and control rights that 
are disproportionate to its stock ownership, and which are negotiated 
as part of the financing agreement.144 
 
 139 For example, creditors might use the threat of accelerating debt to exercise 
significant control over the company. See Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How 
Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenant Violations, 63 J. FIN. 2085, 
2085 (2008); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 138, at 1217. 
 140 See Chen, Private Company, supra note 135.  
 141 Debt financing has several drawbacks, including losses of control, lack of 
liquidity, and restricting ability to attain future capital. See infra Part IV.B.1, for more 
in-depth discussion of the drawbacks of using debt financing to scale. In terms of 
growth through revenue, or bootstrapping, it is extremely difficult and often impossible 
to scale up through revenue alone. See ALLEYNE ET AL., supra note 122, at 122; Bartlett, 
Shareholder Wealth, supra note 27, at 256. 
 142 For companies that do not wish to scale up, using debt or revenue to finance can 
present a viable option. But these companies then have to forgo the option to scale up, 
limiting their social and economic impact. 
 143 See SHAI BERNSTEIN, RAMANA NANDA & ALLISON CIECHANOVER, HARV. BUS. SCH., 
NEWVIEW CAPITAL AND VENTURE CAPITAL SECONDARIES 2-3 (2019); Bartlett, Shareholder 
Wealth, supra note 27, at 263; Pollman, Team Production Theory, supra note 88, at 627-28. 
 144 Syndication of investments also increases the likelihood that VC investors will 
enjoy collective control over the startup. See Bartlett, Venture Capital, supra note 88, at 
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VCs generally follow a high-risk, high-reward portfolio investment 
strategy in which they actively invest in a number of startups but plan 
for a very small number to generate outsize returns through an IPO or 
acquisition.145 Under the VC model, analysis has shown that only about 
6% of startups, representing about 4.5% of dollars invested, generate 
about sixty percent of total returns.146 The VC model relies on the most 
promising companies going public or getting acquired and doing so 
within a relatively short timeframe, so that VCs can achieve a liquidated 
return within the lifetime of the fund — usually around seven to ten 
years.147 
As a result, the VC model often places distinct pressure on venture-
backed startups to pursue an IPO or acquisition, and to do so quickly.148 
These startups face serious disincentives from scaling privately — and 
in fact are frequently actively discouraged or barred from doing so by 
investors who may collectively control the board or exercise control 
disproportionate to their level of stock ownership. This funding 
structure often eliminates or significantly undermines long-term private 
sustainable growth as an option. For a variety of reasons, then, private 
growth on its own is not a viable solution for companies with objectives 
beyond profit that seek to scale or that seek to have large-scale impact. 
C. The Lacking Commitment Mechanism 
When a company with objectives beyond profit seeks to scale, it thus 
faces three unappealing options: IPO, get acquired, or go it alone 
privately. And if the company is venture-backed, the pressure to pursue 
one of the first two options — which are most highly associated with 
losses of strategic and managerial control — is frequently quite strong. 
No matter which avenues a multiple-objective company pursues, it is 
difficult to reliably tie itself to the mast of its social purpose and profit 
objectives through private ordering.  
Companies with objectives beyond profit encounter this problem 
whether they traditionally incorporate, incorporate as a PBC, or 
 
55; see also BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 8-11; Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra 
note 27, at 263-66; Pollman, Team Production Theory, supra note 88, at 619.  
 145 See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 2. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. Firms that pursue private equity financing also face this similar problem. 
 148 See Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 27, at 263-65 (explaining the 
bargaining control VC investors can exert over company decisions for liquidity-
constrained founders). This is even the case for many, if not most, socially conscious 
investment firms, which still need a return on their investment and favor exit as the 
means of doing so. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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privately contract, including B-Corp certification. For companies that 
pursue traditional incorporation, their charter commitments and 
internal organizational practices have little staying power. The loss of 
strategic control associated with an IPO or acquisition means these 
measures are easily removed, ignored, or eliminated. Even for the small 
number of companies with multiple objectives that are able to scale up 
privately, they may still experience a loss of strategic control, 
particularly if they finance through debt. In addition, the loss of 
managerial control can make it difficult to maintain the internal 
organizational practices that once preserved the objectives beyond 
profit. 
For PBCs, the legal incorporation form proves largely toothless. 
Narrow and weak enforcement mechanisms, as identified in Part II, 
result in little accountability for managers and directors of PBCs at any 
stage. The losses of strategic and managerial control at scale compounds 
this lack of accountability: those with newfound strategic and 
managerial control can simply redirect the company however they 
desire, which frequently results in a loss of the objectives beyond profit. 
On its own, then, the PBC form does not provide a meaningful 
commitment mechanism at scale. 
Finally, private contracting and B-Corp certification also lack 
commitment mechanisms to help companies pursue objectives beyond 
profit at scale. New managers and directors can easily change the terms 
of their contracts with stakeholders such as employees, customers, and 
suppliers. They can also easily let the B-Corp certification expire. B-
Corp certification requires significant sustained company resources to 
achieve and maintain. This rigor is both a blessing and a curse: it 
provides the highest third-party standard available, but it also makes it 
easy to abandon the certification. Private growth combined with B-Corp 
certification is perhaps the best strategy for a company with multiple 
objectives seeking to scale because it helps reduce problems associated 
with the loss of strategic control. But to pursue this route requires 
largely forgoing most sources of available capital, including outside 
equity capital (and possibly debt), in order to retain strategic control. 
Because of the significant VC pressure to IPO or sell on a short timeline, 
it may also mean forgoing VC capital earlier in the lifecycle of the 
company. Forgoing VC capital can threaten early-stage and growth-
stage company survival — as well as company long-term potential 
impact — by eliminating a significant potential source of capital for 
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liquidity-constrained founders.149 Private contracting and B-Corp 
certification thus prove largely insufficient to protect the pursuit of 
multiple objectives at scale. 
No matter which way these companies privately order themselves — 
no matter how they incorporate or privately contract — they cannot 
reliably commit to their pursuit of objectives beyond profit. Under 
existing private ordering frameworks, when companies with objectives 
beyond profit scale up, they can easily renege on whatever promises 
they made at the outset to pursue social purpose alongside profit. In 
other words, the existing options lack a durable commitment 
mechanism that enables the company to bind itself to objectives beyond 
profit in the future.  
The lacking commitment mechanism is problematic because it limits 
these companies’ potential social impact. It is problematic because it 
prevents these companies from assuring prospective investors and 
employees, who make significant firm-specific investments, that the 
company will abide by its social purposes over the long-run. And it is 
problematic because it hinders these companies from privately ordering 
as they wish. As a result, most companies with multiple objectives either 
raise outside equity capital to scale and lose their social purpose 
objectives in the process, or they forgo outside equity, remain small or 
fail, and have limited social and economic impact.150 Despite the 
promise of the PBC form, business law does not currently provide a 
viable commitment mechanism to help address this problem. 
 
 149 Because founders are generally liquidity-constrained and lack the ability to secure 
traditional bank financing, VC finance is a significant source of capital to overcome 
these financing challenges. See Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra note 27, at 263.  
 150 Some notable examples diverge. Patagonia has famously remained a privately held 
company that continues to pursue social objectives alongside profit. Several publicly traded 
companies also seek to pursue dual objectives, though opinions differ on their degree of 
success. Examples include Danone and its subsidiary Danone North America, which is the 
largest certified B-Corp in the world, and Unilever, which engages frequently in socially 
conscious acquisitions. Danone and Unilever are headquartered in Europe, to which many 
attribute a different underlying cultural approach to the pursuit of social good in business. 
There is also Laureate, the first ever publicly traded public benefit corporation, though may 
question the true social impact of the company. The insurance company Lemonade, which 
is both a PBC and a certified B-Corp, went public in July 2020 in the year’s best IPO debut 
to date. Vital Farms, a Delaware PBC and certified B-Corp known for its pasture-raised egg 
production, went public in an extremely successful IPO on July 31, 2020. See Chloe 
Sorvino, Vital Farms’ Blockbuster IPO Proves Wall Street Has an Appetite for Sustainable 
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IV. PROPOSING SOLUTIONS 
To help address the lacking commitment mechanism, this Part 
proposes providing a voluntary commitment mechanism in business 
law. This proposal would require multiple stakeholder board 
representation and socially conscious executive compensation for PBCs 
that go public, get acquired, or exceed a certain size. This Part also 
discusses the merits and critiques of this proposal compared to several 
other potential solutions in corporate governance and corporate 
finance. 
A. Providing a Commitment Mechanism in Business Law 
This subpart proposes providing a voluntary commitment 
mechanism in business law by enacting a two-pronged amendment to 
PBC law that would apply to PBCs that go public, get acquired, or 
exceed a certain size.151 This proposal would require first, multiple 
stakeholder board representation, and second, socially conscious 
executive compensation for these PBCs.152 
1. Multiple Stakeholder Board Representation 
The first prong of the proposal would trigger multiple stakeholder 
board representation for scaled PBCs.153 This prong would require equal 
numbers of shareholder-elected representatives and social purpose-
 
 151 In other words, for these companies — which have voluntarily opted into the 
PBC form — the commitment mechanism would not be waivable or redeemable, but 
rather, would provide a tighter framework on how the firm operates in order to provide 
a meaningful commitment device. 
 152 The proposal focuses on Delaware because it is the most significant United States 
jurisdiction from a business law perspective. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
Derivative Litig., 659 A.2d 961, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (“Delaware is 
recognized as a pacesetter in the area of corporate law.”); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann 
O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 678 (“The 
corporation leader in the United States is now Delaware.”); Omari Scott Simmons, 
Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1172 (2008) (“Delaware is viewed as a pioneer and perennial 
leader in the market for corporate law.”). 
 153 For wholly acquired PBCs, it could require a separate, balanced board for the 
subsidiary, as for example Ben & Jerry’s negotiated with Unilever. Indeed, it is quite 
common for subsidiaries in general to have separate boards from their parent 
companies. See DELOITTE, GOVERNANCE OF SUBSIDIARIES: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL COMPANIES 
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elected representatives on the board.154 The social purpose board 
members could consist of employee-elected employee representatives; 
nonprofit representatives from charities related to the company’s social 
purposes; or academic representatives. They could also include a 
representative who does currently or has recently served as an executive 
or board member of another PBC or B-Corp. And they could include 
representatives with a long-term association with the company and 
knowledge of its founders, history, multiple objectives, and 
organizational identity — although in keeping with good governance 
practices, the number of long-term insider representatives should not 
exceed the number of outside social purpose representatives.155  
Relatedly, it may be beneficial to retain the company’s founder or 
current CEO on the board, past his or her tenure in management. 
Management research has shown the critical and long-lasting effects of 
founders’ and early officers’ imprints on their companies.156 These 
imprints can last long past the founders’ tenures or even lifetimes — 
even for large-scale publicly traded companies.157 Several examples 
illustrate the importance of founder or early CEO visionary leadership 
to the success of companies with multiple objectives. Patagonia’s 
founder Yvon Chouinard, Danone’s CEO Emmanuel Faber, Ben & 
Jerry’s founders Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, and Beyond Meat’s 
Ethan Brown are all widely believed to have outsize and ongoing impact 
on their companies’ successful pursuit of objectives beyond profit, 
including at scale, and for many of them beyond their tenure in 
management.158 Including these representatives on the board, if they are 
no longer serving in a management capacity at the company, could have 
significant impact on retaining multiple objectives post-IPO or post-
acquisition.159  
 
 154 Elements of this proposal have been adapted from two real-world examples. First, 
Ben & Jerry’s moderately successful external social purpose board, and second, from a 
large multinational company in the sample, which uses outside advisory boards to help 
it push forward its commitments to social purpose. See Austin & Leonard, supra note 
85, at 94; Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 155 See Lucian Bebchuk & Michael Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance 
Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939, 944 (2010). The presence of these independent 
directors on the PBC board would ostensibly provide them an informational advantage 
over outsiders that would enable them to add value to the company. 
 156 See Battilana et al., supra note 32, at 1659; Vallaster et al., supra note 35 at 22-23; 
see also REINHARDT ET AL., supra note 16. 
 157 See Battilana et al., supra note 32, at 1659; Vallaster et al., supra note 35, at 22-23.  
 158 See, e.g., REINHARDT ET AL., supra note 16, at 1; Austin & Leonard, supra note 85.  
 159 And, including the founders, a former CEO, or another long-term company 
representative can help preserve the objectives beyond profit without requiring the 
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However, this proposal is not without downsides. Including insiders 
on boards runs counter to the growing consensus around an increased 
role for independent board members as good corporate governance 
practice.160 Trading off the importance of imprinting and a visionary 
founder or CEO with the downsides of insider entrenchment must be 
considered carefully, and should be mitigated by ensuring the number 
of total insider social purpose board members does not exceed the 
number of independent social purpose board members. In addition, the 
number of insider board members across both shareholder-elected 
members and social purpose board members should not exceed the 
number of total independent board members. This proposal seeks to 
address this concern by limiting long-term insider spots on the board to 
just one or two — the founders or most recent CEO. 
This Paper derives several details of the multiple stakeholder board 
proposal from real-world businesses’ experiences. To take a specific 
example, Ben & Jerry’s negotiated an outside social purpose board — 
an unusual term in an acquisition — which has helped retain pursuit of 
objectives other than profit after its acquisition by Unilever.161 The 
external social purpose board helped protect the company’s social 
purposes, albeit not perfectly, during a time period when the parent 
company did not have leadership that particularly valued Ben & Jerry’s 
social purpose orientation.162 
 
blunt approach of dual-class shares. For greater discussion of dual-class shares, see infra 
Part IV.A.1. 
 160 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Weisbach, supra note 155, at 943-44. But see James D. Cox, 
Fair Pay for Chief Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE 
COLD WAR, ch. 6 (P.D. Carrington & T. Jones, eds., 2006) (noting that independent 
directors can suffer from the same agency problems as the managers they are charged 
with monitoring, particularly because of the importance of the CEO in selecting 
independent directors). It should also be noted that a provision that ensures longevity 
may also be at odds with efforts to improve the racial and gender diversity on boards. 
Because founders and long-term insiders in these industries tend to be white and male, 
a provision that ensures their retention is a provision that undermines diversity efforts. 
For example, following this process of retaining insiders has previously gotten the tech 
industry in trouble. See, e.g., Lisa Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same 
Old Story, 89 N.C. L. REV. 856, 880-83 (2011). 
 161 See Austin & Leonard, supra note 85, at 94; Marchese, supra note 85. 
 162 See Austin & Leonard, supra note 85, at 94; Marchese, supra note 85. To take 
another example, one large company uses outside advisory boards comprised of 
nonprofit managers and academics to help reinforce and advance its commitments to 
social purpose. Notably, this company is an unusual example in that it is a wholly 
owned subsidiary; its parent company is also committed to both social and financial 
goals and helps drive the subsidiary’s social goals. This arrangement perhaps helps 
explain why the subsidiary successfully relies on more informal advisory boards, rather 
than having an external social purpose board. And yet, even with a parent company that 
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Empirical research in management has also shown the importance of 
implementing this kind of “organizational guardrail” in organizations 
that articulate objectives beyond profit.163 Organizational guardrails 
refer to “formal structures, leadership expertise, and stakeholder 
relationships” associated with each of the organization’s multiple 
objectives, which facilitate ongoing adherence to both core 
organizational goals, and thereby help sustain both over time.164 The 
multiple stakeholder board represents one such guardrail.165 For 
example, evidence has shown that including multiple stakeholders on 
the board enables better fulfillment of objectives beyond profit.166 In 
addition, research on employee representation has shown that worker 
representation on corporate boards can help result in greater worker 
fulfillment and better treatment of employees, without negatively 
impacting capital formation.167 This additional representation from 
outside directors is also in concert with the mounting movement toward 
increasingly independent boards as good corporate governance.168 
The process of board selection is also an important component of this 
proposal. Relying on consistent and sustained outside third-party 
perspectives to select the board helps support robust pursuit of social 
purposes while avoiding entrenchment and following good governance 
practices.169 It provides an ongoing system of checks and balances to 
 
drives its commitment to objectives beyond profit, this subsidiary still enacts 
organizational guardrails consisting of outside social purpose advocates. This example 
underscores the importance of outside social purpose representatives on these 
companies’ boards to help retain the pursuit of multiple objectives at scale. Empowering 
these boards with more than simply advisory capacity seems particularly important 
when, as in most cases, the company does not have an especially socially conscious 
parent company reinforcing its pursuit of multiple objectives. See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 163 See, e.g., Smith & Besharov, supra note 18, at 1; see also Battilana & Dorado, supra 
note 18, at 1431; Pache & Santos, supra note 18, at 995; Vallaster et al., supra note 35, 
at 20.  
 164 See Smith & Besharov, supra note 18, at 1. 
 165 See Austin & Leonard, supra note 85, at 96; Vallaster et al., supra note 35, at 20. 
 166 See Austin & Leonard, supra note 85; Vallaster et al., supra note 35, at 20.  
 167 See Julie Yen, Julie Battilana, and Emilie Aguirre, Worker Well-Being, Workplace 
Democracy, and the Pursuit of Multiple Objectives, in HANDBOOK ON THE BUSINESS OF 
SUSTAINABILITY (forthcoming 2021); Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer & Jorg Heining, 
Labor in the Boardroom 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26519, 
2019). 
 168 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.  
 169 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 160 (pointing out the potential perils of CEOs having a 
large role in selecting independent directors). Removing the selection of the social 
purpose board members from the CEO’s ambit would help address these problems — 
though raises the corollary question of who would comprise the coalition that elects the 
social purpose board members. 
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better ensure informed and diverse perspectives on social purpose as 
the company evolves.170 Non-shareholder third parties that select the 
social purpose board members could include nonprofit organizations 
such as B-Lab, the third-party certifier of B-Corps; or the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), an organization that sets 
financial reporting standards; or other charitable organizations related 
to the company’s specific social purpose.171 It could also include 
academics or the founders themselves, if they are not on the board. In 
addition, the employee representative will be employee-elected. 
Ensuring that outside, disinterested parties — and not board members 
or senior management — select the social purpose members will help 
ensure social purpose board members are robust advocates for the 
objectives beyond profit, can help avoid managerial entrenchment, and 
can help address board independence concerns.172 
In addition to the mandatory rule for acquired or public PBCs, this 
proposal would also establish a default rule — that is, an opt-out rule 
— of multiple stakeholder board representation for privately held PBCs 
upon twenty percent founder equity dilution. This level of dilution 
often occurs when a startup secures Series A venture capital funding. 
Series A funding can be a key inflection point for companies with 
objectives beyond profit because of shifting power dynamics and 
incentives that occur with the introduction of an outside VC investor.173 
Supplying a default rule at this critical inflection point provides 
companies that pursue objectives beyond profit with a framework to 
help them pursue multiple objectives at a critical juncture. Doing so can 
not only help preserve the objectives beyond profit, it can do so without 
requiring founders or managers to become experts in the academic 
corporate governance and management literatures, reducing 
transaction and information costs. But if these firms do not want to 
 
 170 For example, ensuring outside involvement in board selection can also help 
address current efforts to diversify boards. Because founders and long-term insiders 
tend to be white and male, a provision that maintains their involvement undermines 
diversity efforts. This reliance on third-party nonprofit involvement can help provide a 
check against this status quo and broaden out pursuits of social purposes.  
 171 See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/ 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V9LX-CAKJ] (“[The Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board] connects businesses and investors on the financial 
impacts of sustainability.”). 
 172 Ensuring third-party selection of social purpose board members finds support in 
the literature on what constitutes good corporate governance and board independence. 
Fairfax supra note 160. 
 173 See, e.g., infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining how the Buffer Company ultimately bought 
out its VC investors). 
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enact the multiple stakeholder board, the default rule also enables opt-
out, preserving the value placed on private ordering in business law. 
This proposal suggests broadening board representation to include 
social purpose board members. If this approach is not considered to go 
far enough, a further step could even consider creating a new liability 
rule for social purpose board members. This rule — which would 
admittedly be quite a controversial proposal — would, for example, 
subject all board members to standard duties of care and loyalty, but the 
duties could run to the constituency that elected the individual board 
member rather than automatically to shareholders. For example, the 
employee representative would be liable to employees, and the other 
social purpose board members would be liable to the third parties 
involved in their election, such as B-Lab, SASB, or another charitable 
organization, and traditional board members would of course be liable 
to shareholders.174 A new liability rule would raise a host of issues, but 
could be considered to further distinguish the PBC form from 
traditional corporate forms if desired.175 
The multiple stakeholder board has several upsides. First, because it 
is required of those companies that opt in, it helps specifically address 
the lacking commitment mechanism in business law. In addition, it is 
well-suited to address the loss of strategic control at scale because it 
targets the composition of the board. As described previously, outside 
equity financing generally results in a dispersal of ownership and 
dilution of founder equity.176 Founders or current management, who 
have led the company to success thus far, lose their ability to elect the 
board. As a result, they lose high-level strategic control over the 
company. Multiple stakeholder board representation presents a 
structural solution to help address this loss of strategic control by 
requiring representation of the social purpose on the board, but only for 
those who voluntarily opt in. Introducing social purpose board 
members helps better match board representation to the company’s 
 
 174 In this case, remedies for breach should only include injunctive relief or 
economic damages that would go toward curing the neglected social purpose, and no 
economic damages should be awarded to the suing stakeholders personally. This rule 
would mirror current rules in PBC law and Model Benefit Corporation legislation.  
 175 In addition to being likely politically intractable, this new liability rule would 
raise a host of other issues. For example, would it would better align directors’ 
incentives, or would it actually entrench directors in pursuit of a narrow set of interests? 
Would any directors even be willing to serve under these terms? How would individual 
liability would actually work and would it be effective in practice? Would D&O 
insurance undercut the utility of such a rule? Alternatively, would D&O insurance 
become prohibitively expensive? 
 176 See supra Part III.A. 
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objectives, ensuring both social purpose and profit are represented and 
better balanced at the board level. In doing so, it helps mitigate 
pressures to diverge from the pursuit of the multiple objectives, 
especially in the presence of an increasing number of outside investors 
who may not value social purpose as highly.177 Boards will be better 
equipped to balance social purpose and profit objectives in their critical 
high-level decision-making — such as setting overall company strategy 
and hiring officers including the CEO. 
There are also several potential critiques to this proposal. First, this 
proposal is offered as an empirically informed starting point, and not as 
a fully worked out solution, to help solve the lacking commitment 
mechanism in business law for companies with objectives beyond 
profit. It will be critical going forward to optimize the details of the 
proposal to ensure it best achieves its aims. Another potential critique 
may argue that other countries engage in multiple stakeholder board 
representation to negative effect. Relatedly, detractors of this multiple 
stakeholder board proposal may argue that putting different 
stakeholders on the board does not mean they will adequately represent 
the broader interests of the company or their constituents once elected. 
A third related critique might argue that increasing the board or 
introducing representatives with such different constituencies may 
result in intractable decision-making or irreparably upset internal board 
dynamics. For example, influential arguments have posited that worker 
representation in Germany undesirably blocks company decision-
making or results in disinvestment in the company.178  
 
 177 For companies that pursue social purpose and profit objectives, stakeholder-
inclusive governance and the “design of formal, structured, and ongoing connections 
with complex stakeholder networks” that are inherent to these companies have been 
shown to be particularly important to retain the multiple objectives. These pressures 
can go both ways: As outside equity investors increase, the company may experience 
additional pressure to pursue the profit objective. But it may also experience pressure 
to pursue the social purpose objective at the expense of achieving profitability or even 
viability — for example from customers, employees, or even third-party certifiers. 
Ensuring balance on the board helps chart a middle course between the two objectives. 
See, e.g., Vallaster et al., supra note 35, at 20 (noting a balance between decision makers 
“allows for-profit hybrids to acknowledge and strategically address evolving 
expectations in distinct economic and socio-environmental ecosystems”). 
 178 See, e.g., Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: 
A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449, 449 (1984) (positing that “in the 
absence of binding contracts inputs will not be employed efficiently if the union has any 
power”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: 
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473-75 
(1979) (arguing “codetermination or industrial democracy is less efficient than the 
alternatives which grow up and survive in a competitive environment”). 
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Yet proponents of the German model point to the success of German 
businesses and relative superior well-being of German workers 
compared to the United States. For example, one empirical study of 
German firms found that codetermination — that is, including workers 
on boards — actually resulted in positive effects on capital formation 
and long-term investment in the firm, rather than disinvestment, as 
feared.179 In addition, nonprofit boards are usually much larger in size 
than for-profit boards, and contain members representing a range of 
social purpose and financial objectives, yet they function successfully 
on the whole. These examples suggest a counterpoint to concerns about 
intractability or ineffectiveness of larger boards that represent a wider 
range of constituencies. 
2. Socially Conscious Executive Compensation 
The second prong of the proposal would require socially conscious 
executive compensation in PBCs that go public, are acquired, or exceed 
a certain size. For most major companies, executive pay is linked 
heavily to financial performance-based metrics, which currently 
account for an average of 90–95% or more of executive 
compensation.180 Executive compensation is generally tied to stock 
price, achieving quarterly targets, and measures of profitability.181 For 
PBCs that pursue both social purpose and profit, this method of 
compensation ignores a significant proportion of their objectives. It 
creates lopsided incentive structures toward the profit objective at the 
expense of the social purpose objectives.182 
Instead, this prong of the proposal would link a significant proportion 
of executive pay in these PBCs to certain social impact metrics. These 
 
 179 Jäger et al., supra note 167, at 3. But see Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller, 
Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations 44 (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Law Working Paper No. 509, 2020) (arguing against mandatory codetermination in the 
U.S. and pointing out the inconclusive evidence on codetermination in Germany). It 
should be noted, however, that Dammann and Eidenmueller refer to codetermination 
that would elect around half of a company’s board, rather than one seat, as this proposal 
would require. 
 180 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 149-50 (2020); Cox, supra note 160, at 102. 
 181 For example, financial metrics are generally the sole metrics used when 
determining executive compensation, valuating the company, and so on. Stock price 
and quarterly targets are two examples of financial metrics used to assess performance. 
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 180, at 139-40, 153. 
 182 See Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. 
REV. 937, 941-42 (2020) (“Ideally, the firm should have a financial stake in the 
accomplishment of the social mission.”) [hereinafter Designing Business]. 
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social impact metrics could include employee satisfaction, 
environmental impact, and B-Corp score. For example, this proposal 
could require linking ten percent of executive compensation to 
employee satisfaction, ten percent to environmental impact, and ten 
percent to achievement of a certain B-Corp score, for a total of thirty 
percent of executive compensation linked to social impact.183 
Recognizing that PBCs frequently experience a loss of managerial 
control at scale whether they are publicly traded, acquired, or privately 
held, this proposal would apply not only to acquired and public PBCs, 
but also to PBCs above a certain size. 
Employee satisfaction could be measured by a survey administered at 
regular intervals to all employees and contractors.184 The survey could 
be as simple as a standard net promoter score (“NPS”), in which 
employees are asked to answer on a scale of one to ten how satisfied 
they are with their employer. Environmental impact could be measured 
via a third-party standard such as the metrics put forth by SASB, the 
nonprofit third-party organization that sets financial reporting 
standards.185 The B-Corp score could be assessed by performance on B-
Lab’s certification scheme. Companies need to score a minimum of 
eighty points to achieve certification, but can score a maximum of two 
hundred, leaving ample room for improvement across a range of 
categories even for certified B-Corps, particularly since no company 
has, to date, achieved a perfect score of two hundred. 
For all of these measures, executive compensation could be linked in 
several ways. It could follow a sliding scale, such that the higher the 
score, the higher the compensation. Or it could be linked in a binary 
way, with that proportion of the CEO’s compensation triggered only if 
a certain minimum score is achieved. It could also be structured to 
reward executives for improving their scores in the different categories 
by a certain percent, or for achieving or maintaining a certain score. 
Alternatively, the board could set certain social impact goals, with 
executives compensated only if they meet those goals. For example, one 
multinational company links employee and executive bonuses to the 
achievement of certain measurable social impact goals that the 
employees set themselves each year in conjunction with their 
 
 183 Not all PBCs are certified B-Corps. If a PBC did not want to certify as a B-Corp, 
it could assess its score using B-Lab’s publicly available assessment tool. 
 184 Both of the in-depth field sites in the research sample — both the early-stage 
startup and the large-scale publicly traded company — engage in this practice of 
surveying employee satisfaction. See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 185 SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 171. 
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managers.186 One option would be for this proposal for socially 
conscious executive compensation to also follow that framework. In 
addition, this proposal would require that the company’s multiple 
stakeholder board approve the socially conscious executive 
compensation scheme, to help better ensure arms’ length dealing and 
accountability. This element of the proposal also underscores how these 
two prongs would work together in tandem and mutually reinforce each 
other. 
As with multiple stakeholder board representation, socially conscious 
executive compensation could take several forms, and of course the 
devil is in the details. It will be critical to identify the right social impact 
metrics to properly incentivize desired outcomes. When designing 
socially conscious executive compensation provisions, it will also be 
key to strike the right balance between standardization and flexibility. 
On the one hand, the scheme must consist of standardized legal rules 
that cannot be gamed. On the other, it must also have the flexibility to 
enable companies to tailor to their individual circumstances and to 
accommodate inevitable evolutions in social purposes over time. As 
with multiple stakeholder board representation, this Paper does not 
claim to have optimized the proposal for socially conscious executive 
compensation in PBCs, and much can be critiqued about the specific 
details offered.187 But it does claim to offer an empirically informed 
starting point and basic framework to help address the lacking 
commitment mechanism in business law for companies with objectives 
beyond profit. 
Socially conscious executive compensation has several upsides. First, 
it is well-suited to address the loss of managerial control at scale by 
incentivizing managers to take social purpose objectives into account 
alongside profit. Linking a substantial percentage of executive 
compensation to social impact metrics would elevate social purpose to 
a more balanced position alongside profit, and better ensure executives 
take the social purpose objectives into account in their daily 
management of the company. In addition, the use of metrics 
 
 186 See Aguirre, supra note 12. It should be noted that arms’ length negotiation has 
been shown to be an important factor linked to good governance in determining 
executive pay. It will be important to ensure striking a balance between calibrating 
incentives that are best linked to their intended social impact metrics, and avoiding 
executives coopting their own payment structures. See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71-72 (2003) 
[hereinafter Executive Compensation]; LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE ix (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE]. 
 187 Defining the specifics of these metrics is the ongoing subject of future empirical 
work. 
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documenting the company’s social impact would further strengthen the 
credibility of its commitment by providing quantifiable and auditable 
assurances to investors and employees, who invest their financial and 
human capital in the firm, that it will not stray from the pursuit of 
multiple objectives.188 Socially conscious executive compensation 
would provide an additional organizational guardrail to protect the 
objectives beyond profit as these companies scale up. 
There are also several critiques to this proposal. A primary critique is 
that linking executive compensation to achieving certain financial 
metrics has led to negative unintended consequences.189 Performance-
based compensation in the financial context has frequently been shown 
not to solve the agency problems it intends to address, or to properly 
incentivize executive behavior to achieve intended outcomes.190 It is not 
clear, then, why it should be extended to the socially conscious context 
when it has not been proven to work well in the financial context. 
However, the failure to properly align incentives in other contexts 
does not mean performance-based compensation should be eliminated 
wholesale. Rather, it suggests a need for greater emphasis on correctly 
 
 188 See BRAKMAN REISER & DEAN, supra note 22, at 124-26; Eldar, Designing Business, 
supra note 182, at 940 (“[I]t is extremely difficult to verify companies’ social impact. 
Existing measures of social impact tend to be vague, include metrics that are difficult to 
quantify, and even mix shareholder protection metrics with environmental or societal 
ones.”). 
 189 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 186, at ix (arguing 
that “[f]lawed compensation arrangements have been widespread, persistent, and 
systemic, and they have stemmed from defects in the underlying governance structure 
that enable executives to exert considerable influence over their boards. Given 
executives’ power, directors could not have been expected to engage in arm’s-length 
bargaining with executives over their compensation”); JEFFREY PFEFFER, WHAT WERE 
THEY THINKING?: UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT MANAGEMENT 75 (Harvard Bus. Sch. 
Press, 2007) (finding that incentives that are too large begin to drive, and thereby 
distort, behavior, leading them to backfire, whereas rewards that are large enough to be 
noticed, and provide an occasion for celebration and recognition, can help better 
generate successful and intended outcomes); Bebchuk & Fried, Executive Compensation, 
supra note 186, at 72; Robert Daines, Vinay B. Nair, & Lewis Kornhauser, The Good, the 
Bad and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill 7 (NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-005, 2005) 
(finding that the effect of incentive-based executive compensation is highly context-
dependent and varies depending on various characteristics of firms); Kevin J. Murphy 
& Michael C. Jensen, The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating 
Executive Compensation, 1-3 (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law, Ctr. For Law & Soc. 
Sci. Research Paper Series No. 18-8, 2018). 
 190 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 186, at 4; PFEFFER, 
supra note 189, at 78; Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The 
Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1558 (2005); Bebchuk & Fried, Executive 
Compensation, supra note 186, at 72-73; Daines et al., supra note 189, at 6-7; Murphy & 
Jensen, supra note 189, at 49-51. 
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calibrating incentives to the desired outcomes, and adjusting 
accordingly if a set of incentives results in unintended consequences.191 
Research showing the context-dependency of successful incentive-
based executive pay suggests that incentives can indeed help drive 
desired managerial behavior — but to do so successfully requires 
certain characteristics be met, such as properly calibrating the 
incentives, spending adequate time devising the incentives, and arriving 
at them through arms’ length negotiation.192 The successful experience 
of one large multinational company that links bonuses to the 
achievement of social impact metrics also provides an important 
counter-example to address this critique.193 It suggests that with the 
right metrics, socially conscious compensation could be implemented 
successfully in practice. The presence of a multiple stakeholder board 
can also help by increasing independent (and socially conscious) 
director involvement in executive compensation, and de-emphasizing 
reliance on financial metrics that may have previously been 
distortive.194 
 
 191 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, Getting Incentives Right: 
Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 523, 523 (2014) 
(on recalibrating incentives in the banking context to better incentivize desired 
executive behavior); Cox, supra note 160 (describing the harmful features of poorly 
designed financially-based executive compensation). 
 192 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 186, at ix; PFEFFER, 
supra note 189, at 80; Bebchuk & Fried, Executive Compensation, supra note 186, at 89; 
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and 
Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009); Daines et al., supra 
note 189, at 18; see also Anabtawi, supra note 190, at 1599 (asserting an alternative 
tournament theory explanation of executive pay that explains the disconnect between 
performance and pay, and arguing that reallocating decision-making authority away 
from boards and toward shareholders in response would be misguided); Cox, supra note 
160, at 106, 109 (explaining the little amount of time boards (or compensation 
committees) devote to devising executive compensation packages, and the insularity of 
the process).  
 193 See Aguirre, supra note 12. 
 194 To the extent that socially conscious executive compensation reduces managers’ 
say over their own pay and increases arms’ length negotiations over executive pay, and 
to the extent it creates less distortive incentives by diversifying the metrics by which 
executives are compensated, this proposal would help address and mitigate some of the 
serious shortcomings plaguing current executive compensation arrangements as 
identified not only in the business law literature, but also the finance and management 
literatures. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 186, at x; 
PFEFFER, supra note 189, at 80; George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1125, 31-
33 (1994) (arguing that compensation contracts based solely on objective performance 
measures create distorted incentives); Bebchuk & Fried, Executive Compensation, supra 
note 186, at 71, 74; Daines et al., supra note 189, at 27. 
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Another critique asks why companies cannot engage in socially 
conscious executive compensation on their own and need a change in 
the law to implement this measure. Of course, companies can adopt 
socially conscious executive compensation on their own, and in fact 
some do. But the problem identified in this Paper is that they cannot 
adequately commit themselves to doing so over the long-term. Creating 
a voluntary commitment device in business law by requiring socially 
conscious executive compensation in PBCs helps address this problem. 
The required element of the proposal — again, for companies that have 
voluntarily elected to opt in — is critical to its effectiveness as a 
commitment device. 
In addition, for this proposal to succeed, it will require development 
of more robust social impact metrics in order to assess whether these 
firms are succeeding in achieving their social aims.195 Over the last 
several decades, the for-profit sector has developed in-depth financial 
metrics that are now taken for granted as the only significant way to 
assess company performance.196 These financial metrics include, for 
example, profit, revenue, stock price, valuation, and quarterly targets. 
The unidimensional accounting practices that underlie this system also 
rely solely on financial metrics. Equivalently robust social impact 
metrics lag behind.197 They lag in robustness, uniformity, and social 
acceptance as an important performance indicator for a for-profit 
company — even one that explicitly and overtly pursues both social 
purpose and profit objectives. And they lag in particular outside of the 
sustainability context. 
Some accounts claim that the lack of robust social impact metrics is 
because it is too difficult to quantify social impact. But progress in 
sustainability metrics provides a counter-example. For example, SASB 
has developed robust, largely generalizable metrics that are gaining 
traction as the gold standard in assessing company performance in 
sustainability. In his most recent annual letter to CEOs, BlackRock 
Chairman and CEO Larry Fink called for firms to make standardized 
 
 195 Improved social impact metrics would also facilitate the success of the voluntary 
commitment mechanism proposal by enabling better, more holistic assessment of board 
activity, and particularly of the social purpose activity of boards.  
 196 See Frank Dobbin & Dirk Zorn, Corporate Malfeasance and the Myth of 
Shareholder Value, 17 POL. POWER & SOC. THEORY 179, 179-80 (2005); see also Jill E. 
Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 934-40 (2019) 
(showing how the SEC has long considered sustainability not properly part of financial 
disclosure); Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270, 
272 (1996). 
 197 See Eldar, Designing Business, supra note 182, at 940 (“The problem is that it is 
extremely difficult to verify companies’ social impact.”). 
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sustainability disclosures and promoted the use of SASB and other 
environmental metrics, suggesting that they are gaining both robustness 
and social acceptability.198 In addition, companies often individually 
track non-financial metrics, and even use some of them as key 
performance indicators (“KPIs”) internally, which could also give 
greater insight into development of other social impact metrics.199 
These successful examples suggest potential for further developing and 
standardizing social impact metrics in other critical areas, such as 
employee well-being, population health outcomes, community impact, 
and racial and gender diversity. At present, the under-development of 
social impact metrics impairs holistic and accurate assessment of 
companies with objectives beyond profit.200 For the socially conscious 
executive compensation proposal to succeed, it is necessary to further 
develop social metrics in order to generate well-calibrated incentives 
and to measure whether a company meets its social goals. 
B. Corporate Governance Solutions 
There are also several other potential solutions to the commitment 
mechanism problem, including in corporate governance. This subpart 
describes two ways in which companies might attempt to structure their 
corporate governance to commit to their pursuit of objectives beyond 
profit after scaling, through dual-class shares and charter and bylaw 
commitments. It also discusses merits and critiques of each of these 
options. 
 
 198 BlackRock has stated it will use its considerable influence by increasingly voting 
against management and directors that do not make sufficient progress on 
sustainability-related disclosures. Whether BlackRock follow through on this threat or 
not, this example underscores the growth occurring in developing social metrics. It also 
highlights considerable gains in public support that increasingly treat social metrics as 
legitimate indicators of company performance, at least in the area of sustainability. Larry 
Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/ 
corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/7PPE-RTAB]. 
 199 For example, one company in the sample tracks its B2B customers’ stress levels 
through administered surveys, generating data on its impact on mental health in the 
industry it serves. See Aguirre, supra note 16. 
 200 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 196, at 923 (arguing for the need for improved 
standardization to improve comparability and reliability of sustainability disclosures in 
financial reporting). 
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1. Dual-Class Shares 
Enacting dual-class shares refers to the practice of offering two 
different shares of stock: one reserved for founders or insiders, and the 
other offered publicly on an exchange but with limited or no voting 
rights, and therefore little to no say over corporate governance.201 
Several high-profile companies like Facebook and Snap use dual-class 
share structures, as well as the New York Times.202 Publicly traded 
companies using dual-class shares appear to get the best of both worlds 
by securing outside equity capital without giving up strategic (voting) 
control of the company.203 Usually these companies use dual-class 
shares as a private ordering instrument to protect founders’ or early 
management’s control and preserve their idiosyncratic desires for 
running the company.204 Companies that articulate objectives beyond 
profit have some parallels, in that they also seek to protect the founders’ 
or early management’s idiosyncratic desires at scale — though in this 
case the idiosyncratic desires also have social value.  
Although they seem to address the commitment mechanism problem, 
dual-class shares have several key drawbacks. First, they are a blunt 
instrument that broadly strips shareholders of all or most of their rights 
over corporate governance, further entrenching managers.205 It is an 
overly broad solution that is not well-tailored to the narrower goal of 
retaining the pursuit of multiple objectives post-scale.206 In addition, 
because some shareholders may be socially conscious, stripping all 
shareholders of all or nearly all voting power could actually be 
detrimental to pursuing multiple objectives beyond profit. Dual-class 
 
 201 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 124, at 585; Dhruv Aggarwal, Ofer Eldar, Yael V. 
Hochberg & Lubomir P. Litov, The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs 1-5 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2020-78, 2020); James Chen, Dual Class Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dualclassstock.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/PC8R-BXD3]; see also Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient 
Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 701-02 (2019); Dave Michaels, Facebook, Snap 
and Other Firms Targeted by SEC Regulator’s Attack on Dual-Class Shares, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
15, 2018, 4:30 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-to-viacom-targeted-by-sec-
regulators-attack-on-dual-class-shares-1518730229 [https://perma.cc/M5TM-LU7L]. 
 202 Michaels, supra note 201.  
 203 Lund, supra note 201, at 691; Chen, supra note 201.  
 204 Lund, supra note 201, at 715-16; Chen, supra note 201. Although the nature of 
controllers in dual-class shares now varies significantly across firms adopting this 
structure. Aggarwal et al., supra note 201, at 1-5. 
 205 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 124, at 602-03. But see Lund, supra note 201, 
at 744. 
 206 See generally Winden & Baker, supra note 124 (discussing the complexities of 
multi-class stock structures). 
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shares have also been shown to generate large agency costs, decrease 
firm value, and increase tunneling, a practice where insiders direct 
company assets to themselves for personal gain.207 The dual-class shares 
solution also ignores that the primary problem facing companies with 
multiple objectives has to do with scaling up generally, and not with 
IPOs per se. This solution therefore only addresses one part of the 
problem and largely ignores acquisitions.208 
Using dual-class shares also exacerbates risk, both in capital markets 
and from a regulatory perspective.209 For example, dual-class shares 
would likely severely curtail financing opportunities for a large number 
of companies with objectives beyond profit — namely, for those that 
are not extremely highly valuated at the time of their IPO or do not have 
“unicorn” status, such as Facebook or Snap.210 Companies that pursue 
multiple objectives beyond profit already often struggle to access 
outside capital because of their unique organizational practices and 
structures.211 A dual-class share structure would likely exacerbate this 
problem, sending an unattractive and risky signal to investors or 
potential buyers. In addition, there has been significant and mounting 
pushback against dual-class shares, including from the SEC and several 
 
 207 See Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting Out 
Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 Q.J. ECON. 121, 121-22 (2002) 
(finding increased risks of tunneling for firms with dual-class shares); Bebchuk & 
Kastiel, supra note 124, at 603; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George 
Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and 
Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 445, 445 (R. Morck ed., 2000); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew 
Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1, 36 (2007) (finding increased agency costs and decreases in firm value for 
firms with dual-class shares). But see Lund, supra note 201, at 744 (arguing that issuing 
voting and nonvoting shares can reduce inefficiencies associated with voting). 
 208 It is conceivable that a company could use a dual-class share in an acquisition, 
but it is highly unlikely that an acquirer would be interested in purchasing a company 
over which it would have no strategic or managerial control. 
 209 Cf. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Risks, Goals, and Pictographs: Lawyering to the Social 
Entrepreneur, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 301, 302 (2015) [hereinafter Risks, Goals and 
Pictographs] (describing risk evaluations applied to start-up social entrepreneurs). 
 210 Unicorn startups are those valued at $1 billion or more. James Chen, Unicorn, 
INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/ 
unicorn.asp [https://perma.cc/CD3U-PKAX]; see Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 124, at 
626; Bebchuk et al., supra note 207, at 28-30; Bertrand et al., supra note 207, at 122; 
Gompers et al., supra note 207, at 15. 
 211 See Heminway, supra note 120, at 308-09; Plerhoples, Risks, Goals and 
Pictographs, supra note 209, at 317. 
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leading index funds.212 The SEC recently stated opposition to allowing 
dual-class companies to go public.213 The three largest index providers 
recently changed eligibility requirements for their benchmark equity 
indexes to exclude, limit, or underweight companies with multi-class 
stock structures.214 Dual-class shares thus present a significant set of 
downsides that undermine their attractiveness as a systematic solution 
to the commitment mechanism problem.  
2. Charter and Bylaw Commitments 
Companies could also structure their corporate governance to include 
commitments to the objectives beyond profit in their charters or bylaws. 
A charter, also known as a certificate of incorporation, is a short legal 
document that formally establishes a corporate entity.215 It outlines the 
company’s basic components, such as its name, headquarters, and any 
restrictions on business activity or stock issuance.216 Bylaws are the core 
governing documents of a corporation. They are longer than the charter 
and generally contain detailed provisions about the business and affairs 
of the corporation.217  
Corporations use charters and bylaws to tailor corporate governance 
arrangements to their individual company needs.218 A corporation that 
wants to commit to pursuit of objectives beyond profit could include 
such provisions in its charters or bylaws. For example, it could include 
a requirement that the corporation always remain a certified B-Corp, 
absent a one-hundred percent shareholder approval to the contrary. 
Charter and bylaw commitments offer the benefit of leveraging private 
ordering and not requiring any additional legislation to effect.  
But they also have several downsides. First, extreme charter 
commitments that seek to irrevocably constrain the company risk 
binding it to certain objectives that an original set of shareholders 
desired, but that future shareholders may not wish to maintain for any 
number of reasons.  
 
 212 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 203, at 1060; Winden & Baker, supra note 124, 
at 3.  
 213 See Lund, supra note 201, at 746. 
 214 See Lund, supra note 201, at 708-11; Winden & Baker, supra note 124, at 4.  
 215 Will Kenton, Charter, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
charter.asp (last updated Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/T5X9-LEX9].  
 216 Id.  
 217 See Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 15; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) 
(2020). 
 218 Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 3; see Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 
3, at 378-80; see also tit. 8, § 144(a). 
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On the other hand, even extreme charter or bylaw commitments may 
also be relatively easy to undo or ignore. In the case of bylaws, corporate 
law, including in Delaware, grants significant freedom to directors to 
amend bylaws unilaterally as part of their authority to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation.219 Once a company is scaled, 
whether through IPO or acquisition, and founders have lost control 
over the board, any commitments in the bylaws would likely be easy to 
undo, undermining their utility as a commitment mechanism.220 
Charter commitments present a few additional obstacles to amend, but 
they too may be too easy to change or ignore to function as a useful 
commitment device. For companies that have been acquired and are 
wholly owned, the acquirer owns one-hundred percent of the target, 
giving it the power to amend the charter unilaterally.  
For publicly traded companies, too, it may be difficult for the charter 
provision to function as a meaningful commitment device. Although 
charter amendments typically require both board and shareholder 
approval, in practice, it is often not overly burdensome for publicly 
traded companies to opt out of their initial charter commitments.221 
First, only directors can propose charter amendments — not 
shareholders. This power gives directors a wide degree of control over 
setting the ballot and determining the issues over which shareholders 
ultimately vote.222 In addition, dispersed shareholders (as exist in 
publicly traded companies) have both a collective action and a rational 
apathy (or ignorance) problem.223 Because they are entitled to one vote 
 
 219 See Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 1; Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 
3, at 379 (stating that the vast majority of Delaware corporate charters vest directors 
with the authority to unilaterally adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws). It should be noted 
that for Delaware corporations, unlike most other jurisdictions, the board enjoys the 
power to amend the bylaws only if granted that authority in the articles of incorporation. 
James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
257, 258 (2015). 
 220 See Cox, supra note 219, at 263 (stating that when a “shareholder acquires shares 
with only the awareness that the board of directors can unilaterally amend the bylaws 
to accomplish a constellation of objectives. Even the most efficient market cannot be 
prescient; thus, serious information deficiencies eviscerate the likelihood of pricing the 
impact of the board’s power over the bylaws”); Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra 
note 3, at 373.  
 221 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) 
(explaining opting out after a company’s initial charter has been set) [hereinafter 
Limiting Contractual Freedom]. 
 222 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2020); Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 13. 
 223 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 221, at 1837 (referencing the nature of shareholders 
in voting). 
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per share, it is not rational for shareholders with small stakes to expend 
significant energy voting, given their small impact on the outcome. In 
practice, this system affords particular power to shareholders with 
larger stakes, who de facto control the board and therefore charter 
amendment proposals and outcomes.224 Even extreme charter 
commitments may therefore not be safe from amendment for companies 
that scale by going public and that lose control over the board.225  
C. Corporate Finance Solutions 
Companies can also attempt to solve the commitment mechanism 
problem in how they structure their corporate financing. This subpart 
describes potential debt financing mechanisms, such as restrictive debt 
covenants and poison puts, and securing socially conscious capital. It 
also articulates merits and downsides for each.  
1. Debt Covenants and Poison Puts 
There are various ways to attempt to memorialize objectives beyond 
profit through debt financing, including entering into restrictive debt 
covenants and implementing so-called “poison puts,” also known as 
“proxy puts.”226 Debt covenants are restrictions that lenders put into 
place to ensure borrowers engage in or refrain from certain behaviors.227 
 
 224 See, e.g., John C. Coates, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles of Institutional 
Investors in Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 84-
87 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (highlighting the power of activist 
investors of various types — both individually and collectively — to influence company 
behavior even when holding relatively small stakes in a company that are well short of 
full control). 
 225 See Bebchuk, supra note 221, at 1830-31; Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 8-9; see 
also Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1260-61 (2008) (arguing that minority shareholders have more power 
than ever before, and activist investors are using this power to influence managers’ 
behavior); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority 
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1124-25 (2016) (showing 
shareholder inability to cast an effective vote against director candidates); Plerhoples, 
Social Enterprise as Commitment, supra note 13, at 91 (noting the lack of accountability 
for companies that seek to pursue social purpose goals alongside profit goals). 
 226 See, e.g., David A. Katz, Delaware Court Raises Bar for Use of “Poison Put” 
Provisions, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 15, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/15/delaware-court-raises-bar-for-use-of-poison-
put-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/CGH6-CQKD].  
 227 What Are Debt Covenants?, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute. 
com/resources/knowledge/finance/debt-covenants/ (last visited, Jan. 10, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/FNF5-AGNQ]; see also Bartlett, supra note 27, at 257-58; Baird & 
Rasmussen, supra note 138, at 1212. 
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Usually these restrictive debt covenants are financially oriented — such 
as restricting payout of dividends, or requiring yearly audited financial 
statements.228 But companies could also enter into debt covenants as 
commitment devices to their objectives beyond profit — for example, 
to achieve a certain B-Corp score or meet another social metric. The 
lender could then accelerate the debt if the company violated a 
covenant.  
Poison puts are a type of takeover defense strategy in which target 
company debt is accelerated in the event of a takeover.229 When a 
company has a poison put covenant in a bond, an acquiring company 
must pay the full cost of the bond if it wants to acquire the target.230 A 
company could issue a bond with a social poison put covenant that 
would trigger upon certain events it considers antithetical to its pursuit 
of objectives beyond profit, such as a takeover or an activist investor 
acquiring a meaningful stake.  
Using these corporate financing mechanisms have some compelling 
upsides. For example, they may provide a strong commitment 
mechanism due to the catastrophic consequences, including a risk of 
company liquidation, if triggered. The overwhelming effectiveness of 
the poison pill as a parallel example is instructive: in the almost forty 
years since its invention, the poison pill has been triggered only once.231 
It has never failed in keeping the commitment promised. In addition, 
pursuing debt financing usually ensures founders retain voting control 
over the company, as they do not dilute their equity in exchange for 
capital. Retaining voting control can help preserve the pursuit of 
multiple objectives by helping prevent a loss of strategic control. For 
companies looking to tie themselves to the mast of their pursuit of 
 
 228 See Bartlett, supra note 27, at 257-58. 
 229 Will Kenton, Poison Put, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ 
poison-put.asp (last updated Mar. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7FX4-XKV7]. 
 230 Id.  
 231 There have been two to three other, smaller, triggers that have occurred over the 
forty years, but just one notable instance. See Matt Levine, Opinion, Don’t Eat the Poison 
Pill by Mistake, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018, 8:02 AM PDT) (citing LATHAM & WATKINS 
LLP, LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRIGGERING OF A MODERN POISON PILL: SELECTICA, INC. V. 
VERSATA ENTERPRISES, INC. (Mar. 2009), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/ 
pub2563_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7J4-92ZV]), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2018-07-25/don-t-eat-the-poison-pill-by-mistake [https://perma.cc/K87H-2LXH]. 
Whether the poison pill is preclusive or offers a meaningful opportunity of success to a 
hostile bidder could raise potential issues under Delaware law (preclusivity) and the 
Williams Act (meaningful opportunity of success). These are live and consequential 
debates in corporate law, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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objectives beyond profit, doing so through debt financing mechanisms 
may appear attractive.  
But there are several countervailing downsides to using debt 
financing instruments as commitment mechanisms. First, in general, 
there are several general disadvantages to using debt financing rather 
than equity financing to scale.232 Most importantly, using debt generally 
limits capital infusion, restricting companies’ potential impact and 
speed of growth. In addition, although founders may retain voting 
control, they frequently give up significant control over the operation 
of the company through debt covenants, which can be even more 
restrictive on company action than loss of strategic control through 
equity dilution.233 In addition, debt may also be an unattractive prospect 
for a company with uncertain cash flow, as is the case for many 
companies poised to scale up. And it limits the ability to attain future 
financing, making the company a riskier lending prospect. 
Debt financing is also generally undesirable for scaling up because, 
unlike an IPO or acquisition, it does not naturally provide founders, 
early employees, and early investors with liquidity — meaning they do 
not receive a cash out for some or all of their early investments in the 
company. Liquidity is often a critical factor in the scale up. Early 
employees or founders, who have taken on a lot of risk forming or 
joining the startup, eventually need some form of liquidity in their 
investment, even if just partial. And early outside investors also need a 
liquidated return on their investment. Although there are ways to 
creatively structure debt financing to provide some intermediate 
liquidity, it is not a natural feature of this form of financing.234 
There are also significant downsides associated specifically with 
restrictive covenants, poison puts, and other similar mechanisms in 
debt financing. First, committing to social purpose objectives through 
restrictive debt covenants or accelerating debt repayment is sub-optimal 
because it places enforcement of the social purpose objectives in the 
hands of lenders. Mainstream lenders’ incentives are not generally 
aligned with achievement of a borrower’s social purpose objectives. 
Achieving social purpose objectives is also not generally lenders’ 
 
 232 In a world without taxes or government regulation, bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, and with perfect information and an efficient market, in theory there would be 
no difference between financing through debt or equity financing. Clearly those caveats 
do not apply in this case. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262 (1958). 
 233 See Bartlett, supra note 27, at 257-58; What Are Debt Covenants?, supra note 227.  
 234 See ALLEYNE ET AL., supra note 122, at 14.  
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expertise.235 The lender may not care enough or have the capacity to 
actively monitor the social purpose covenants. In addition, even if (or 
perhaps especially if) the lender were aligned with the firm’s social 
purpose objectives, it may be unwilling to actually enforce the debt 
acceleration terms if doing so destroys the firm. Managers could 
anticipate and exploit lenders’ hesitation to enforce social purpose 
terms, undermining the potential effectiveness of this solution. Placing 
enforcement power with lenders thus may not lead to effective and 
consistent enforcement of borrowers’ social purpose objectives.236  
In addition, debt covenants and poison puts — and indeed, contract 
provisions generally — may not be specific, anticipatory, or flexible 
enough to effectively address all the potential eventualities that may 
arise in the course of running a business. Instead of relying on specific 
contract terms to enforce social purpose, it may be important to specify 
a process or a framework to guide board and managerial action in this 
context.237 These debt financing terms may also turn out to be relatively 
weak commitment devices — if, for example, the borrower could simply 
refinance the debt to make the restrictive covenant or poison put go 
away. 
Because these measures are new and largely untested, they may also 
expose companies to significant potential risk. It is not clear whether 
courts will enforce these mechanisms. For example, the poison pill is a 
famous and effective commitment mechanism and its legality is now 
largely taken for granted. But at its inception, it was a risky experiment 
in private ordering and took years to validate in the courts.238 In 
addition, recent litigation suggests courts may apply heightened 
scrutiny to poison puts or other financing mechanisms that affect 
shareholder voting rights or serve as anti-takeover devices, threatening 
their potential enforcement.239 This uncertainty underscores the 
 
 235 Though some lenders, such as social impact or ESG lenders, may be so aligned. 
 236 Socially conscious lenders that use third-party standards for accountability may 
help mitigate this concern, but would also come with the downside of limiting the 
amount of capital available for these types of loans. 
 237 As an analogy, take for example, the incomplete contract explanation for why 
fiduciary duties are necessary. It is not possible to write a contract specifying every 
possible eventuality in the course of managing a business or financial relationship. 
Creating a duty helps provide a framework of behavior for managers or trustees to make 
properly oriented decisions. See Bartlett, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, supra note 88, 
at 107 (discussing incomplete contracting theory); Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth, supra 
note 27, at 265-66 (discussing fiduciary duties and contract renegotiation). 
 238 See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985). 
 239 Courts have expressed wariness about upholding lending measures that are not 
really about lending. If a poison put is used as a takeover defense, the court will apply 
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riskiness, potential costliness and, if not upheld, possible 
ineffectiveness of these measures.240 
2. Socially Conscious Capital 
Another potential solution is for companies with objectives beyond 
profit to secure capital from socially conscious investors, often known 
as impact or ESG investors. It is estimated that the size of the impact 
investing market now exceeds $715 billion globally, and as of 2014, 
$6.57 trillion in total assets under professional management in the 
United States used at least one socially responsible investment 
strategy.241 These investors span both debt and equity, and even include 
a growing number of venture capital firms.242 The major upside to this 
approach is that the investor ostensibly supports the company’s pursuit 
of multiple objectives, better aligning incentives between the two 
parties.243  
But there are also significant downsides.244 First, although the total 
amount of impact investment capital is numerically large, it still 
represents a tiny fraction of total assets under management globally — 
less than one percent.245 This solution requires locating an outside 
 
Unocal scrutiny, which could also apply here. See Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 68 
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 240 See generally Plerhoples, Risks, Goals and Pictographs, supra note 209 (discussing 
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 242 See Mary Ann Azevedo, Growth with an Impact, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), 
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available for investments in firms that promote social purposes at below-market returns 
. . . .”); Dorothy Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
 244 See, e.g., Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 163 (arguing that “to 
view [socially responsible investing] and social enterprise as synonymous is 
misguided”). 
 245 It is estimated that total assets under management (AUM) globally reached 
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total capital. Compare Anne Field, With $715B in AUM, Impact Investors Stay the Course, 
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despite the pandemic), with Global Assets under Management Set to Rise to $145.4 Trillion 
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investor who exactly matches the company’s balance between profit and 
social purpose objectives, and then ceding control rights to that investor 
and hoping it will keep the company accountable over time. But it may 
be difficult to find the exact right outside investor to match the 
company’s objectives, particularly because impact investing is still a 
relatively small space. And even with a perfect match, it simply pushes 
the commitment mechanism problem out one degree, creating the issue 
of who will monitor the impact investor.246 
There are also specific downsides depending on whether a company 
seeks impact investment in the form of debt or equity. Impact 
investment in the form of debt still presents nearly all of the identified 
concerns above about debt financing, including especially, more limited 
potential growth and impact.247 Impact investment in the form of 
equity, such as socially conscious VC funding, presents different 
concerns. Notwithstanding their commitment to social goals, socially 
conscious VC firms still adhere to the general VC model. They will still 
generally require an exit, whether in the form of an IPO or acquisition, 
to generate a liquid return in the life of the VC fund. This pressure to 
exit can be at odds with a venture-backed company’s objectives beyond 
profit.248 
The real-world example of the company Buffer helps illustrate the 
concern. When Buffer raised Series A funding in 2014, it specifically 
sought a non-traditional VC that would support its objectives beyond 
profit.249 Buffer and its like-minded VC structured the terms of their 
deal differently than most traditional Series A funding, adding special 
provisions to reflect Buffer’s objectives beyond profit.250 And yet Buffer 
still found it was losing some of its core values while it grew. In 
response, it decided to pivot more deliberately toward long-term 
 
by 2025, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/press-room/global-assets-under-management-
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 246 See Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, 164 (stating that “it is 
noteworthy that commitment devices may be weak in some [socially responsible 
investment] funds. While some funds can change their social criteria only with a 
shareholder vote, other funds can alter investing policy without consulting the 
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 247 See supra Part IV.C.1. But see Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, supra note 
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sustainable growth. As a result, as its founder described, Buffer was no 
longer “on a traditional venture-funded path.”251 To satisfy its VC 
investors’ need for a liquid return while also enabling pursuit objectives 
beyond profit, Buffer decided to take the extremely unusual route of 
buying out its VC investors.252 Buffer was able to pursue this largely 
unprecedented route because it had unusually achieved profitability 
after Series A funding and was able to build up enough cash reserves to 
buy out its investors — a rare feat. Additionally, and also unusually, it 
had not given up control of the company in raising its Series A funding, 
and so, relatedly, it only needed to buy its investors out of a relatively 
small amount ($3.3 million).253 Buffer’s solution is highly creative and 
was ultimately effective, but is essentially unprecedented and largely 
unavailable to the vast majority of venture-backed startups in the 
current financing landscape.254  
The Buffer example provides a cautionary tale about socially 
conscious venture-backed investment. Even with Buffer’s tailored 
terms, like-minded investors, and unusual early profitability providing 
investors with a steady return, it still was not aligned with the VC 
model. It helps illustrate the challenges facing companies that articulate 
objectives beyond profit and still want to access mainstream capital 
markets to achieve large-scale impact — both socially and 
economically.255 
D. Advocating a Solution in Business Law 
This subpart addresses potential general critiques of the commitment 
mechanism proposal and compares it to the solutions identified in 
corporate governance and corporate finance. Ultimately, it advocates for 
this proposal providing a voluntary commitment device in business 
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 254 This example highlights that if there were a greater variety of funding options for 
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law.256 By targeting socially conscious executive compensation and 
multiple stakeholder board representation, this proposal both provides 
incentives for managers to simultaneously pursue the social and 
financial goals of the company, and helps ensure they have the 
competence to succeed in doing so.257 
One potential critique of this proposal disfavors mandatory rules in 
business law. Instead, proponents of this view prefer a corporate law 
that provides a set of optional standard-form contracts that enable 
private ordering.258 But this proposal is not inconsistent with this view: 
it would provide a voluntary commitment mechanism for companies 
that wish to opt in to bind themselves to the pursuit of objectives 
beyond profit. It would not require anything of companies that do not 
wish to opt in. Instead, it simply widens the menu of options available 
to companies in their private ordering by providing them with greater 
accountability through a voluntary commitment device in business 
law.259  
In fact, the mandatory nature of the rule for those who voluntarily 
opt in is critical to enabling private ordering for these firms. Eliminating 
the mandatory element would not provide an effective commitment 
device, and would therefore fail to solve the underlying problem.260 For 
business law to enable private ordering for companies with objectives 
beyond profit — and for PBC law to have substantive meaning — it 
must provide companies with a way to meaningfully commit to their 
 
 256 See Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 3, at 183 (“Gaining access to 
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objectives beyond profit when they scale up. It is precisely the point of 
corporate law to provide such tools and templates, reducing 
information and transaction costs and enabling companies to privately 
order themselves as they wish.261 
Another related critique of this proposal prefers to rely on private 
ordering rather than legislation in business law. Indeed, private 
ordering and experimentation in management offer many benefits and 
lead to important innovations. But they can also come with several risks 
and costs. For example, novel governance and financing arrangements 
risk costly and time-consuming legal challenges. In some cases — for 
example, with the poison pill — it can take years for courts to uphold 
(or invalidate) the provision. Several of the options identified as 
potential corporate governance and corporate finance solutions have 
not yet been tested or upheld in courts, increasing the risk and cost 
associated with their implementation. In contrast, this proposal would 
provide a pre-approved, standardized, and reliable off-the-rack solution 
in corporate governance for companies with objectives beyond profit.262 
It would not require specialized lawyering and would avoid legal 
uncertainty, including costly and time-consuming risks of litigation and 
judicial invalidation.263 Providing a standardized and pre-approved 
commitment mechanism also better enables third parties to draw 
clearer, more consistent inferences about these companies, because 
these scaled PBCs would share a basic common framework and 
corporate governance. By helping to hold companies to the corporate 
governance arrangements for which they originally bargained, this 
 
 261 See Choi & Min, supra note 126, at 12; Cox, supra note 219, at 260 (stating that 
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1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). 
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approach would also better facilitate reliable third-party contracting and 
help minimize marketplace risks associated with implementing 
untested experimentations in private ordering.264 
Relatedly, it is important to remember the tension between restrictive 
corporate governance and financing arrangements, and access to 
capital. Particularly when accessing capital markets (that is, when 
securing funding for the company), there is a cost to businesses of 
engaging in governance and financing arrangements that deviate from 
the norm.265 For example, a company could conceivably combine a 
dual-class shares arrangement with a charter commitment to retain B-
Corp certification absent one-hundred percent shareholder approval to 
the contrary. But this company would likely struggle to secure capital 
to scale: investors and acquirers would be reluctant to buy stock in a 
company with such extreme corporate governance, where they attain 
no voting rights, in an environment where companies adopt notoriously 
mimetic structures to optimize their access to capital.266  
In contrast, a ready-made bundled option for firms with objectives 
beyond profit may present a more attractive means of accessing capital 
markets because it preserves shareholder voting rights — unlike, for 
example, dual-class shares. This proposal would not strip shareholders 
of their voting rights wholesale. Instead, it would distribute power 
differently, retaining voting rights for shareholders so they would be 
able to elect their board representatives, while also ensuring these 
shareholders that there will also be board representation to protect the 
social purpose. It is important to remember that these shareholders buy 
into the firm with the goal of receiving a blended social and financial 
return. In this way, shareholders get to participate in the governance of 
the firm, while also providing guardrails to help ensure they receive the 
blended social and financial return for which they bargained. This 
proposal would help the PBC form to more faithfully reflects a PBC’s 
prescribed legal duties to balance both social purpose and profit 
objectives. This rebalance of power reinforces the PBC legal entity as 
distinct from other for-profit legal entities, and the fact that its structure 
should meaningfully reflect this distinctiveness. 
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Another common concern about creating lasting commitment 
mechanisms is the so-called “dead hand objection.” This concern relates 
to a fear of binding companies to certain objectives that they may value 
at Time One, but which turn out to be undesirable at Time Two, 
whether because the firm naturally evolves its objectives in response to 
changing societal norms, or the original objectives prove inefficient, 
intolerable, or otherwise obsolete. This critique underscores the critical 
importance of devising the details of the proposal to adequately strike a 
balance between bright line rule and flexible standard. Ultimately, the 
details of the law must be reliable, consistent, and minimize 
susceptibility to gaming, while also providing sufficient flexibility to 
enable individual tailoring and accommodate natural and expected 
evolutions in firms’ social purpose objectives over time.  
But it is also likely that the proposal addresses the dead hand concern 
better than any of the identified options in corporate governance or 
corporate finance. This proposal creates a commitment that is sticky but 
not irreversible,267 unlike some of the extreme corporate governance 
and corporate finance solutions, which are either relatively easily 
undone or ignored (not sticky) or impossible to undo or lead to 
catastrophic consequences if triggered (not reversible).  
Again, because companies voluntarily elect to incorporate as PBCs, if 
this proposal makes the PBC form undesirable, companies can simply 
opt to incorporate in a different form. In addition, recent amendments 
to Delaware corporate law will lower the vote requirement to adopt or 
discard the PBC status from two-thirds to one-half of shareholders.268 
This new requirement will make it easier for companies to sidestep the 
two-pronged commitment mechanism by reincorporating out of the 
PBC form if they desire, again making the commitment sticky but not 
irreversible. It should be noted that this reduction in the vote 
requirement could also weaken the credibility of the commitment 
mechanism, to the detriment of this proposal. But by the same token, it 
will also make it easier for traditionally incorporated companies to 
reincorporate to opt in to the PBC form if they desire a more credible 
commitment mechanism prior to scaling up. 
 
 267 The proposed commitment mechanism is sticky but not irreversible because it 
applies to all companies that choose to incorporate as PBCs, but can be reversed by 
reincorporating out of the PBC form (requiring two-thirds shareholder vote, or soon to 
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 268 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (2020). 
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This response, however, raises another objection that this voluntary 
commitment mechanism proposal may simply deter firms from 
incorporating as PBCs, or drive firms to reincorporate away from the 
PBC upon acquisition, IPO, or Series A funding. Lowering the threshold 
required for reincorporation further underscores the reincorporation 
concern.269 The proposed voluntary commitment mechanism shares 
some of the same critiques of the charter commitments discussed in Part 
IV.B — namely, that acquirers of PBCs and directors of publicly traded 
PBCs could, without much difficulty, simply reincorporate the 
company into a new form, undermining the utility of the commitment 
mechanism. 
It is true that the proposed commitment mechanism cannot fully 
solve for wholly acquired PBCs whose new parent companies wish to 
reincorporate out of the PBC form. For these companies, the proposed 
commitment mechanism may struggle to be adequately sticky because 
of the absolute control rights the parent company gains. In this case, 
however, the proposed solution can serve to provide a better matching 
mechanism to enable targets to identify acquirers with whom their 
values may align, and who may contract to maintain the PBC form. 
Providing a standardized commitment mechanism through the PBC 
form can better facilitate these relationships by enabling the parties to 
draw clear, more consistent references about the target companies. 
For publicly traded PBCs, the proposed solution can better help to 
solve for the lacking commitment mechanism problem than many of 
the identified private ordering solutions in corporate governance and 
corporate finance. Upon going public, these companies would enact a 
multiple stakeholder represented board. The presence of a balanced 
board with social purpose and shareholder representatives would make 
reincorporation out of the PBC form more difficult, but not impossible. 
This proposal thus seemingly strikes a balance between stickiness and 
reversibility that, for example, the charter commitments discussed in 
Part IV.B may struggle to achieve. 
In addition, keeping the PBC form toothless for the sake of driving 
up the numbers of incorporations undermines the purpose of the 
statute. Making the PBC form more meaningful will help enable those 
companies that wish to use the available legal incorporation status to 
successfully pursue their objectives beyond profit. Better empowering 
these companies to succeed can have knock-on effects that bolster their 
perceived legitimacy as organizations. At the same time, it will not 
penalize those who opt out, leaving them to pursue objectives beyond 
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profit in their own way, using traditional incorporation and private 
contracting. It may also help filter those companies with a meaningful 
commitment to objectives beyond profit from those that may be 
engaging in greenwashing.270 The voluntary commitment mechanism 
proposal may also better enable matching between companies with 
social purpose and profit objectives and third-party stakeholders who 
wish to contract with a genuinely multi-objective company. 
Finally, this Paper also acknowledges the critique that the details of 
the commitment mechanism proposal could take many forms not fully 
articulated in this Paper, and that these details matter deeply to 
assessing the merits of the proposal. It recognizes that although this 
proposal is empirically grounded and draws from real-world examples, 
it provides a basic framework and empirically informed starting point, 
but not a fully fleshed out legislative proposal, and that it must grapple 
further with these critical details in the future. 
Notwithstanding the potential downsides or need for future 
refinement of the proposal, this Paper argues for the proposal providing 
a voluntary commitment device in business law to help solve the 
identified commitment mechanism problem. For PBC law to have any 
meaningful effect, it must do more than mandate a standard without 
providing practical enforcement mechanisms. Unlike blunt instruments 
like dual-class shares, this proposal is well-tailored to address the losses 
of both strategic and managerial control at scale. It addresses 
organizational competence and the loss of strategic control by requiring 
more balanced board representation between the social purpose and 
financial objectives, and it addresses organizational incentives and the 
loss of managerial control by better aligning managerial incentives to 
account for the social purpose objectives in the day-to-day running of 
the company. 
It is important to remember that when founders incorporate as a PBC, 
they do so by and large because they want to successfully pursue social 
purpose and profit objectives simultaneously. They turn to the PBC 
legal form, often in spite of significant perceived social or financial 
penalties for doing so, because they believe in the importance of 
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pursuing objectives beyond profit and seek guidance and protection 
from business law to achieve these aims.271 Companies that genuinely 
want to pursue objectives beyond profit are in need of a legal framework 
and commitment mechanism to help them translate their visions into 
practice, particularly at key inflection points such as scaling up. This 
proposal is well-suited to address the lacking commitment mechanism 
problem, contributing to a more meaningful and impactful PBC law. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen an unprecedented surge in firms that explicitly 
commit to pursuing core organizational objectives beyond profit. Many 
of these companies are developing technologies, products, 
organizational structures, and business models to help solve some of the 
world’s most serious problems — including systemic threats to 
sustainability and climate change; public health crises and alarming 
rates of noncommunicable disease; gender, racial, and ethnic 
inequalities; and untenable labor outcomes. In tandem with current 
approaches in government and the nonprofit charitable sector, these 
firms offer potential to help address serious social problems even more 
effectively and efficiently. Many of these companies have a proven track 
record of success on a smaller scale.  
Yet when it comes time to scale up, they face significant challenges 
that often lead to the loss of the objectives beyond profit. Standard 
accounts blame market forces for this problem, citing lack of demand, 
poor underlying business models, greedy investors, capitalism, short-
termism, or the impossibility of businesses pursuing multiple objectives 
at scale.  
This Paper identifies a more fundamental problem. It argues that 
business law is not designed to enable companies with objectives 
beyond profit to scale up. Most importantly, business law lacks a 
durable commitment mechanism to enable long-term pursuit of 
multiple objectives. This problem is particularly acute when scaling up 
because of a dual-pronged loss of strategic and managerial control that 
founders experience at this stage. 
Companies that articulate objectives beyond profit may privately 
order themselves in an attempt to achieve their objectives beyond profit. 
They might incorporate as a traditional general corporation, incorporate 
as a PBC, or privately contract for social good, including through B-
Corp certification. They can also scale up in a number of ways, 
including going public, getting acquired, or pursuing private growth. 
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This Paper argues that no matter how these companies choose to legally 
incorporate, privately order themselves, or scale up, business law fails 
to provide them with a durable commitment mechanism to help counter 
the losses of strategic and managerial control at scale. This inability to 
reliably scale up effectively bars companies with objectives beyond 
profit from substantial potential impact, both social and economic, to 
the detriment of overall social welfare. 
This Paper proposes situating the solution in business law by enacting 
a voluntary commitment mechanism in PBC law. This proposal would 
require multiple stakeholder board representation and socially 
conscious executive compensation for PBCs that go public, get 
acquired, or exceed a certain size. It would offer companies that wish to 
bind themselves to the pursuit of objectives beyond profit a means to 
do so, without imposing any requirements on companies that do not 
wish to opt in to the PBC form. The Paper argues that this business law 
proposal is well-suited to help address the losses of strategic and 
managerial control that occur at scale, by targeting both board 
representation and managerial incentives. 
At present, business law perpetuates a system in which companies 
with objectives beyond profit must either stay small or seriously risk 
losing their social purpose objectives after scaling up. Providing a 
commitment mechanism in business law can facilitate more innovative, 
effective, and self-sustaining solutions to some of society’s most 
pressing problems, better enabling large-scale social impact — instead 
of just large-scale profit. 
